LOGISTICAL SUCCESS: Fascinating display at https://dogwarmth.com/accessories/best-automatic-dog-feeder/ the U.S. Army Transportation Museum @ Fort Eustis, Virginia Date: January 1991 Unit: Third Battalion, 73rd Armor, 82nd Airborne Division Operation: Desert STORM Troopers: 900 Country: Saudi Arabia/Iraq Drop/Landing zone: Log Base C Aircraft: C-130E/H Hercules turboprop aircraft (1, 000 sorties) Equipment airlanded: 45 x M551 Sheridan mild tanks, Humvee trucks, 250,000 gallons of gasoline, 9,000 tons of provides Type Air delivery: STOL airland USAF moved 80% of 3/73rd Armor Bn (M551 Sheridans) by C-130E/H 700 miles west from the King Faud International Airport to a small landing strip outside of Rafha SA close to the SA Iraq border. They moved all the tracked vehicles in the Bn - the C2 M577 (flatbedded) to that location. Some wheeled inventory moved by air but the majority moved over the highway to get into assault position for the "Hail Mary" left hook into Iraq. This included their scout platoon who was test evaluating LAV-25s (LAV-1s) as a result of the LAV-25 did not fit into the C-130 and couldn't fly. This was meant to be a considerably stealth operation. XVIII Airborne Corps had the guts or the feeling it "was worthy" to make use of air resupply so it had expertise and contacts within the USAF to seize a piece of paved highway and get them to airland supplies and troops. USAF CCT site visitors controllers can be essential to information in landings, mark the runway and so forth. since Army Pathfinders will not be "worthy" and educated to do this job. Notice a specialised Army unit was there to fiddle round with fragile 463L pallets as C-130s spent 12 minutes on the ground; me thinks SeaBox's ECDS pallets with forklift slots would have been sooner by dropping them off then taxiing to take-off place. However let me guess. As a result of "cutbacks" Army no longer has models to transfer cargo from aircraft yadda yadda yadda fuking BS. All of the more motive to go together with ECDS pallets and AIP pallets that anyone with a forklift can choose up and transfer--even a bulldozer with Butch Walker's "Bucket Lift" attachment or his Amaze-N-Tow forklift trailer. www.geocities.com/amazentowmilitary Notice the bypass across the commandeered street-turned-into-airfield so floor autos could get back onto the road; wheeled autos cannot simply go anywhere within the desert lest they get caught. General Gavin can be pleased since he wrote about such bypasses in his e-book, "Airborne Warfare" in 1947. Again, more reason to go together with an all-tracked Army. 4. In 1, 000 flights, 9, 000 tons of provides, 250, 000 gallons of gasoline and 900 Soldiers had been delivered. Let's break this down: A C-130 can carry 40, 000 lbs or 20 tons of provides. 450 flights moved the 9, 000 tons of supplies. A C-130 can carry 6 x 500 gallon bladders of gasoline so 3, 000 gallons per sortie means a hundred flights A C-130 can airland ninety two troops so that's just 10 flights This all involves lower than 500 flights, so what was carried in on the opposite 500 flights? Probably a lot of BS Humvee trucks; presumably 1, 000 Humvee trucks... If we had tow kits they might even TOW the gas bladders with them performing as their very own wheels...if towed by wheeled trucks they might get stuck....however if they had been towed by TRACKED XM1108 Gavins its not likely...

STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL FAILURE: WHY DID THE 101st Air Assault Division allow the IRAQI REPUBLICAN GUARD ESCAPE? Operation DESERT STORM: What Really occurred Yes, a number of the 3/73rd Armor's M551 Sheridan mild tanks had been flown in by C-130. We know 3/73rd Armor was there as part of the armored stampede into Iraq for Desert Storm...So why didn't we parachute in an 82nd Airborne BLOCKING Force which had fifty six x M551 Sheridan light tanks and a M577 Gavin C2 APC and will have had a M113 Gavin supplied to each infantry rifle squad and have it seize a stretch of paved street for airland resupply to more aggressively stop the Iraqi Republican Guard (RG) from escaping? The 82nd might have even jumped into FOB Cobra to safe it for the 101st's helicopters to airland--or vice-a-versa. The 101st might even have helped the 82nd get to the ground by airlanding with C-130 fixed-wing aircraft with their extra highly effective light tracked AFV power by securing a stretch of road. Clearly, this sort of Airborne/Air Assault teamwork was absent. 1st TSG (A) Director, Mike Sparks requested 82nd Airborne Division Commander General Johnson about this at an "All American Week" in 1992 or 'ninety three (which had a WW1 82nd DIVISION vet lead a parade!) and he said General Schwartzkopf Wouldn't Let them Jump. Too threat averse or as we surmise CENTCOM populated by heavy tanker "mech pussies" (there is a few validity to this insult) who have been ANTI-AIRBORNE in their mentality of doing simply 2D overland stampedes that folks easily escape from...type of like what Saddam & Company did 12 years later...we additionally think lots of persons are envious of the Airborne leaping as a result of it's fuking cool to jump out of airplane and all the ego trappings of getting a bounce star in your jump wings and many others. We also think the Airborne going round calling folks "legs" is disgusting and makes people hate us when we need their co-operation in combined 2D/3D maneuver warfighting... Snobs might state to the non-Airborne people: "Then go to jump school and get with this system!" Not so easy. The Army would not let anyone go to jump school lest everyone have esperit de corps. We can't have that and still have a zero-sum recreation "pyramid of ego". Again, Gavin---like our biggest Army leaders like Chamberlain, Ridgway and Sherman was not a snob---he needed your entire U.S. Army Able to BE AIRBORNE AND Fight AFTER AIR Delivery; an ATTAINABLE goal. I think we should get on with it; make each Soldier a tiger and cease this lack of exploiting 3D maneuver we need to win twenty first century wars out of petty bureaucratic command put up mission/task back-stabbing fueled by ego envies/rivalries. The actual fact stays you cannot catch enemies with apparent 2D overland automobile stampede "pushes" since they have a "head start". You want to block THEM WITH A CAVALRY; that pressure ought to be the Army Airborne with Light TANKS using fixed-wing aircraft for the distances/occasions wanted. The 101st in typical helicopters needed to hop twice into FOBs after which await gas trucks to arrive. When they finally bought there, they did not have the power to dam the Republican Guards from escaping with just men with hand weapons and BS Humvee trucks. They had been ready to hop a third time. An Army helicopter pilot who was there explains: "Official" Version of Events vs. One View of the "On the ground" Version of Events As the ground offensive was being referred to as off and forces frozen in place I acquired out of my aircraft and stood down from the morning mission that had just been cancelled by the ceasefire. That mission was the Air Assault of the first Bde sized unit north of the E river to dam the RG heading north. My AH-64A Apache company would lead the 101st into a place being called EA Thomas that may act as a choke level as troopers came in and established the anvil on which the armor hammer was speculated to pound the RG. Three Attack Bns of AH-64s (1-101st, 8-229th & 3-227th) working in eight hr loops plus an AH-1 Cobra Attack Bn (3-101st) and a Cav AH-1 Squadron (2/17th) had been anticipated to provide the majority of the killing power in front of the unarmored troopers. I remember considering and hoping at the time that it can be a good idea if the planners had arrange some air assaulted / air lifted / air dropped M113s and or Sheridans to offer the guys on the bottom a better likelihood at safety than the wheeled TOW automobiles would have. If not they would need some seriously dug in positions for protection. The pilots in my unit knew that we had to seek out the RG and once we did we needed to rip and tear at them to make sure that none of their armor fight power made it to the infantry intact and ready to combat. This struggle wouldn't have gone as effectively because the 2D/3D fight you discuss. Since somebody, somewhere deliberate the operation it would seem logical to consider that any AAR would require higher planning in case an analogous operation was wanted in the future. I should believe that did not occur or the 2D/3D forces that you push for would have been examined in depth. I do know that if the ceasefire had not been called for that morning the battle was going to occur. Another resolution would be to air-mechanize the 101st with Mini-Gavins so that they would not should depend on another person with armor to assist out and to make their helos fly quicker and farther with Piasecki VTDP/wings. All coated in our AMS ebook. Another factor we have to do is conserve gas and TOW helicopters on the bottom if we don't need them to fly. And what have been the consequences of letting the RG escape as a result of U.S. army incompetence and narcissism that kept dictator Saddam Hussein in energy for 13 more years? * At the least 200, 000 Iraqis dying * U.S. having to re-invade...once more...with out an efficient 3D maneuver block * Unlike Noriega in Panama, when we fanned out in gentle tracked tanks to block him, we had a slow 2D push with imbecilic USMC in 75% wheeled trucks that was 6 days AWOL reaching Baghdad while the aggressive "thunder run" of the U.S. Army's 3rd Infantry Division toppled the nation-state capital metropolis. * The timid 3D airdrop/airlanding by the 173rd Airborne Brigade and the 1st Infantry Division into Northern Iraq didn't fan out to stop Saddam and subordinates escaping to Tikrit to start a guerrilla battle against us * Thus far the Iraq warfare & occupation has value us over 2, 500 lifeless and 20, 000 wounded American service men/ladies; numbers of human tragedies rising every day as a consequence of a mis-led COIN campaign NOT BEING Excellent Within the Art OF War---Which means Bold 3D AIR-Ground MANEUVER And never Just 2D STAMPEDES---HAS FATAL CONSEQUENSES! Too dangerous General Schwartzkopf was not nearly as good on the operational art as he claimed to be. There are two Huge ideas by no means spoken about that describe what occurs in U.S. DoD and military. The first one is why is everything NEW and so Costly and what we have already got is never totally upgraded and maximized so Now we have More. Idea #1: "We're holding-out-for-our-money-cow" In accordance with Dr. Dixon western militaries are full of people who deep down really don't want to fight and wish built-in excuses like NOT HAVING Enough. Because of this we replace originally 2, 000 F-15s (now we're down to simply 224) with just 184 F-22s. We throw away all our M60 medium tanks and exchange with lesser quantity of M1 heavy tanks. FCS is a basic holding-out-for-a-cash-cow transfer. IF the Army will get Congress to purchase into the false concept that They are THE Experts and that civilians exist solely to supply THEM what they want (militarism) and that FCS IS The best AND Only Way to WARFIGHT; they can have won even when we are able to only afford handfuls. The Army will hold out for more FCSs as the light "mafia" gets what it wants which is the heavy drive in tracks to die by platform neglect and their "modularity" reorganization "helps". HQDA is mendacity to Army Aviation branch that it has a future with a paper Study of a "Joint Heavy Lift" (JHL) helicopter when everyone knows it should take 10 years and 10 BILLION dollars to develop a new chopper to raise the more and more heavy (its now at 30 tons) mythical FCS. Idea #2: "Move apart, I'm hogging the action" When the lightfighters deliberate Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989, THEY Kept HEAVY FORCES Completely OUT OF THE Action apart from 5/6 Mech Infantry in M113 Gavin light tracks (this was thought-about "heavy pressure" as a result of they lack penises and need the armor and tracks). The lightfighters had their very own M551/M113 Gavin light tracked tanks to maintain the the heavy "mech pussies" out; no fight motion = no promotions for them. Along comes Desert Shield/Storm run by CENTCOM and the heavy tankers, so who do they shut out? They wished to send the 82nd Airborne house because it lacked mobility in the open desert (so they are saying) but General Johnson insisted they get to do the "loss of life-from-a-truck" stampede out to the far west of the "Hail Mary"; clearly he was not in a position to get the All Americans to drop into blocking positions as should have occurred because this might imply the glory going Again (Grenada, Panama etc.) to the fuking arrogant name-everybody-a-leg Airborne sorts. The 82nd Airborne provided with M113 Gavin tracks en masse may have paradropped or airlanded into or close to and then went overland to block the Republican Guard's escape, but Schwartzkopf said "NO!" attributable to PETTY BS ATTITUDES of whose going to get the motion/career assist NOT Attributable to SOUND Military LOGIC. So with the heavy tankers in charge, when the M551 Sheridans needed replacing, the M8 Buford AGS mild tank suddenly was much less vital than other funding priorities like a $100M paper examine of a tank to replace the M1 heavy tank. So the Airborne now cannot shut out the Heavy drive mafia from the "motion" in the subsequent battle, but the egomaniacs do not realize this means we should Anticipate THEM TO BE SLOWLY AIRLANDED; scroll right down to see how this enabled Saddam & subordinates to escape during OIF in 2003. Today, the worst kind of excessive lightfighter egotists are in charge, the Schoomaker "mafia" and they are those opposing the Airborne getting gentle tanks as a result of it makes their penis shrivel. So as a substitute of doing WHAT'S Best FOR AMERICA, WHAT'S Best FOR Excellent U.S. Army WARFIGHTING, whoever is in charge of HQDA does what they suppose's best for their Private EGO Club FACTION they got here from or crackpot "vision of warfare" they embrace to make a name for themself as Army Chief of Staff. We have to cease holding out for BS cash cows and combating over which faction in the Army is going to get the motion, AND TAKE THE PLATFORMS We have AND MAKE THEM Able to DOING 3D MANEUVER (and 2D maneuver) nicely--which suggests ending the madness of dismounted-only infantry air assaults and airborne operations. 1993, Somalia: "The time for helicopters had passed" 12 February 2002 A Soldier's Eye-View of "Blackhawk Down", October 3, 1993 The creator of the below E-mail, Gerry Izzo, is currently a Captain at Comair. He flew one of many UH-60s on the mission that is depicted in the movie "Blackhawk Down." The important thing factors you will see that by not having light tracked AFVs natural to the 75th Ranger Regiment or a Ground Cavalry Squadron with the 160th SOAR, helicopters have been tasked to repeatedly fly overhead giving hearth help, which made them sitting ducks for enemy RPGs. If the "time for helicopters had passed" as Captain Izzo concludes at a key point within the mission, then its high time we really Learn from "Blackhawk Down!" as a substitute of sobbing over the men misplaced...AND DO Something CONSTRUCTIVE SO Next TIME WE WIN Without LOSSES. All of the 75th Rangers or 160th SOAR Commanders must do is request some battle-inventory M113A3 Gavins be assigned to them, add gunshields and other refinements, and next time their helicopters is not going to have to loiter overhead to render fire help--they'd have their own heli-transportable "ground spectre"--a M113A3 with a Gatling min-gun and/or 25-30mm autocannon, 106mm recoilles rifles... "During the previous few days many pilots have come up to me and asked me if I had seen the film 'Blackhawk Down'. I do not thoughts talking about the movie, and that i welcome the chance to talk concerning the heroism and valor of my pals. I simply wished to submit some feedback right here about the movie and my impressions. Also I wanted to try to reply some often requested questions. To begin with, I and a lot of my associates that also flew on the mission thought that the film was excellent! It is technically correct and it's dramatically appropriate. In different phrases, the tools, lingo and dialogue are all right on. By dramatically right, I imply that it very effectively captured the emotions and tension that we all felt through the mission. It did this with out being a cartoon, (like Top GUN) or being excessive, (like FIREBIRDS). It's true that the screenwriters needed to consolidate two or three folks into one, however this was essential as a result of otherwise there would have been too many principle characters to keep monitor of. Also within the precise mission we had nearly 20 aircraft within the air that day. In the film they'd 4 Blackhawks and 4 "Little Birds". The unit could not afford to commit the precise number to the filming of the movie. However, through the magic of the cinema, they were able to provide the impression of the true quantity. Our drive mixture was as follows: Super sixty one - Lead Blackhawk Star 41-44 Little Bird Assault Super sixty two - Trail Blackhawk These aircraft made up the assault pressure. Their mission was to enter the buildings and capture the people who were the goal of the day. Super sixty one was shot down, killing each pilots. (They had been CW4 Cliff Wolcott and CW3 Donovan Briley. The three of us shared a room at the airfield.) Star 41 landed at the crash site and the pilot CW4 Keith Jones ran over and dragged two survivors to his aircraft and took off for the hospital. Keith reenacted his actions within the film. Super 62 was the Blackhawk that put in the 2 Delta snipers, Sergeant First Class Randy Shughart and Master Sergeant Gary Gordon. They were inserted at crash site #2. Shortly after Gary and Randy had been put in Super sixty two was struck within the fuselage by an antitank rocket. The entire proper side of the aircraft was opened up and the sniper manning the suitable door gun had his leg blown off. The aircraft was capable of make it out of the battle space to the port space where they made a controlled crash touchdown. (This is not depicted in the film.) Next was the Ranger Blocking Force. This consisted of four x Blackhawks: Super sixty four (CW3 Mike Durant, CW4 Ray Frank) Super 65 (Me, Capt. Richard Williams) Super 66 (CW3 Stan Wood, CW4 Gary Fuller) Super 67 (CW3 Jeff Niklaus, CW2 Sam Shamp) The mission of the blocking power was to be inserted on the 4 corners of the objective constructing and to prevent any Somali reinforcements from getting by way of. Within the movie there's a brief overhead shot of the assault. My aircraft is depicted within the lower left hand corner of the display screen. This is the one part of the movie where I come close to being talked about. Because the assault is accomplished, you hear the Blackhawks calling out of the objective area. If you hear, "...Super sixty five is out, going to holding..." that is my massive movie moment. There is also a fast shot of an RPG being shot at a hovering Blackhawk. I did have one perhaps two fired at me, but I didn't see them or the gunner. I only heard the explosions. We were not in a position to return fireplace, although some of the opposite aircraft did. Make no mistake. I'm totally conscious of my role on this mission. My job was the identical because the landing boat drivers in "Saving Private Ryan." Get the troops in the precise place in a single piece. I'm very pleased with the truth that my crew and that i had been in a position to do this. After having executed this in Grenada, Panama and Somalia, I can identify with the bombardiers of World War Two. You could have to ignore all of the chaos that is going on round and utterly concentrate on the duties at hand. That's holding the aircraft as steady as potential so the Rangers can slide down the ropes as rapidly and safely as doable. Okay, Okay, enough about me. Super 64 was shot down also with an RPG (Rocket Propelled Grenade). They tried to make it again to the airfield, but their tail rotor gave means a few mile out of the objective area. They went down in the worst a part of dangerous guy territory. The dialogue for the film appears to have been taken from the mission tapes because it is exactly as I remember it. (This was the toughest part of the film for me to observe.) The actions on the ground are as described by Mike Durant, as he was the just one from the crew to survive the crash and the gun battle. It was here the Gary and Randy gained their Posthumous Medals of Honor. Super sixty six was known as in at about 2000 hours to resupply the Rangers at the target space. Some of the Rangers were fully out of ammunition and were fighting hand handy with the Somali militia men. (Also not depicted within the film). Stan and Gary introduced their aircraft in so that they have been hovering over the top of the Olympic Hotel with the cargo doorways hanging out over the front door. In this fashion they have been able to drop the ammo, water and medical supplies to the men inside. Stan's left gunner fired 1600 rounds of minigun ammo in 30 seconds. He in all probability killed between 8 to 12 Somali militia males. As Stan pulled out of the objective area, he headed to the airfield as a result of his right gunner had been wounded, as had the 2 Rangers within the again who had been throwing out the provides. Once he landed, he discovered that he'd been hit by about 40-50 rounds and his transmission leaking oil like a sieve. Super sixty six was done for the evening. The final group of aircraft have been the 4 x MH-6 gunships, and the command and management Blackhawk and the Search and Rescue 'Hawk'. They have been: Barber 51-54 MH-6's Super 63 C&C Super 68 SAR Within the movie, the gunships are shown making only one assault. In truth, they had been continuously engaged all night lengthy. Each aircraft reloaded six occasions. It's estimated that they fired between 70 and 80,000 rounds of minigun ammo and fired a total 90 to 100 aerial rockets. They were the only thing that stored the Somalis from overrunning the target space. All eight gunship pilots were awarded the Silver Star. Every one of them deserved it! Next is Super 68. The actions of this crew were very accurately portrayed. The one difference was that they have been truly hit within the rotor blades by an RPG. This blew a semicircle out of the principle rotor spar, however the blade held together long sufficient for them to complete putting in the medics and Rangers at the primary crash site. It was then that they headed to the airfield. What they did not know, was that their primary transmission and engine oil cooler had been destroyed by the blast. As they headed to the airfield all 7 gallons of oil from the main rotor gearbox, and all 7 quarts from each engine was pouring out. They bought the aircraft on the bottom simply as all oil pressures went to zero. They then shutdown, ran to the spare aircraft and took off to rejoin the battle. They had been within the air simply in time to affect the MEDEVAC of Super 62, which had landed on the seaport. The pilots of this aircraft had been CW3 Dan Jollota, and MAJ Herb Rodriguez. Both males have been later awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross. Major Rodriguez is retired from the Army now and he teaches middle faculty with my wife in Clarksville, Tennessee. Finally there is the Command and Control Blackhawk, Super 63. Within the again of this aircraft was my battalion commander, LTC Matthews, and the general floor commander, LTC Harrell. In the movie, there's a scene the place the men on the bottom were begging for MEDEVAC. By this point within the battle we had 5 Blackhawks out of action, either shot down or shot up so much they could not fly anymore. Of the 2 assault power and four blocking drive 'hawks', only myself and Super 67 have been left. I fully anticipated LTC Harrell to send us in to attempt to get these men out. I jacked a spherical into the chamber of my pistol and my M16. I knew that the one way to do was to hover with one wheel balanced on the roof of the constructing. Then the Rangers would be capable of throw the wounded in. I knew that we were going to take loads of hearth and I was trying to mentally put together myself to do this whereas the aircraft was getting hit. My friends had all gone in and taken their licks and now I figured it was our flip. (Peer stress is such a powerful tool if used correctly.) Quite frankly, I really thought that we had been at finest going to get shot down, at worst I figured we had been going to be killed. The best way I noticed it we had already misplaced 5 aircraft, what was 2 more? I had accepted this as a result of no less than when this was throughout General Garrison would be ready to inform the households that we had tried everything to get their sons, fathers or husbands out. We had been even keen to ship in our final two helicopters. Fortunately for me LTC Harrell realized that the time for helicopters had passed. The decision was made to get the tanks and armored personnel carriers to punch via to the objective space. Once again, the dialogue in the film is verbatim. What you do not hear is me breathing a sigh of relief! I remembered thinking that maybe I was going to see the sunrise in spite of everything. I suppose I got somewhat carried away. I really didn't mean to write this a lot. People ask me if this movie has given me 'flashbacks'. I don't think you can name them flashbacks if that day has never been out of my mind. I hope that while you do see the film it's going to fill you with satisfaction and awe for the Rangers that fought their hearts out that day. Believe me, they are fabricated from the same stuff as these children at Normandy Beach. When 1LT Tom DiTomasso, the Ranger platoon leader on my aircraft, informed me that we did a unbelievable job, I couldn't think about ever receiving higher reward than that. I love my spouse and kids, however the greatest thing I've ever executed is to be a Nightstalker Pilot with Task Force Ranger on 3-4 October 1993. Thank you for reading this. I sit up for answering any and all questions anybody may have concerning the film or the precise battle. I simply thought that this would possibly fill in among the blanks. Thanks again". Capt. Gerry Izzo(Super 65) "NSDQ" Nightstalkers Don't Quit Afghanistan: Chinook Down! Another Air Assault debacle: Robert's Ridge This time we didn't even bring artillery to clear/suppress LZs to the fight! In Vietnam, we knew sufficient to blow open LZs utilizing fighter-bombers with delayed-action fuze bombs. LTC Walter Bjorneby USAF (Retired) writes: "F4s of the 4th TFS loaded up for God knows what with CBU24s and fuze-prolonged Mk 82s. We usually carried fuze extenders for making LZs by blowing down trees. I do not think unexploded bomblets (there were all the time some) would help an LZ any. Could be they have been going to hit a truck park someplace. That'd be a great load for it." Why do not we do that at this time? Where does Air Assault techniques stand right now? After reading Colonel Dan Bolger's book, The Battle for Hunger Hill, you get a good suggestion how the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) operates. We applaud then LTC Bolger's boldness at airlanding into LZs AWAY from the target as an alternative of right on prime of it at JRTC. Building on that oblique vertical assault approach, "AIRmotorized" would imply lighter HMMWV mushy-tops with gun mounts that TRANSPORT AN A, B, or C INFANTRY Company at 10-40 mph simultaneously, not just some D firm hard-high fire support HMMWVs running free as the infantry foot-slogs at 1-4 mph. This pressure may even better speed to an goal from a distant LZ. Additionally, we have to employ fast roping/rappelling so we will avoid having to grab an open hazard-area LZ to airland or possibly NONE of these autos are going to make it to the combat! It can be a begin to raised tactics till M113 Gavins may be obtained. After all of the American deaths and maimings in Iraq on account of riding around in poorly armored wheeled trucks, "Death from a Truck" isn't so funny anymore, is it? As stated in now Brigadier General Bolger's e book, the 101st Air Assault Division removes the seats within the Blackhawk to cram 19 males inside, airland them right into a 6-ship LZ (600 meters by a hundred and fifty meters) decided by map recon with out Pathfinding, then await the Chinooks coming in with 2 HMMWV sling-masses each and the HMMWV crews inside. An Air Assault version of the 82d Airborne Division dropping in its automobiles first from "Heavy Drop" aircraft into a gear Drop Zone, followed by Paratroopers in "personnel birds" into a personnel DZ. But in both instances there are only a limited number of autos; the gun or ATGM trucks for "D" Company not transports for the other corporations of Airborne/Air Assault infantry who must walk at greatest 1-four mph. More foot slogging and as we see in Iraq land mines blowing up troopers alongside predictable roads. UH-60 burning after being shot down over Iraq; our personal stupidity flying around in Dark Green when the sky is gray and the ground is tan is killing our men/girls at this time You find yourself with a foot-cellular drive that takes a very long time to reconstitute. It is still Landing Zone (LZ) and DZ dependant simply prefer it was in Vietnam and thus predictable to an alert enemy, who with motor automobiles or armored fighting vehicles can pace to the LZ/DZ and repel the Airborne/Air Assault. To fight off the enemy's vehicular firepower, our personal vehicular firepower remains to be in the sky awaiting the LZ/DZ to be cleared so it might airland! The parachute-deliverable M551 Sheridans and M113 Gavins of the 3/73d Armor Battalion have been disbanded /retired so the one AFVs out there to the 82d Airborne Division are the Immediate Ready Company's four x Bradley Fighting Vehicles and 4 x Abrams Main Battle Tanks which need a runway for the C-17 to airland them. The 173rd is healthier off with a Medium Ready Company with M113 Gavins but this 1st Infantry Division force hasn't been trained to parachute soar and drop in their Gavins to be there immediately when the paratroopers land. They're "legs" and we can't have them soar and earn combat stars, so they have to return later by airland. Both Air Assault and Airborne operations are dependant upon airlanding reinforcements that require open danger areas. The answer here is to improve our Airborne/Air Assault insertion means to avoid these areas. The short answer to finish the foot slogging for the 82d Airborne Division is to obtain air-droppable M113A3 Gavin tracked AFVs with Mk19 40mm GMGs and assign them to its "D" Company Anti-tank items and to transport Javeling ATGM firers. The 101st Air Assault Division will want some totally different changes, first exploiting HMMWV 4x4 trucks for an AIRmotorized surrogate training capability, then light AFVs just like the German Airborne's tracked Wiesel for an AIRmechanized capability by modifying existing M113s into "Mini-Gavins". A tracked AFV can break brush/vegetation for foot Soldiers and provides dominant firepower/safety. THE ESSENCE OF AIRmechanized: the M113 Mini-Gavin In distinction to the "Blackhawk Down!" debacle, with AIRmechanized we suggest that the infantry squad/fireteam fly as an alternative a CH-47 Chinook that carries their very own Mk-19 GMG or L/MMG outfitted M113 Mini-Gavin. Using the secondary floor mobility of the Mini-Gavins, we insert right into a LZ unlikely to be held by the enemy. The infantry Battalion has sufficient unarmored cargo HMMWVs to maneuver 2/3ds of itself if not parceled as employees automobiles so the older era doesn't should walk. A small Pathfinder/Infantry Security platoon inserts first to safe the LZ. If its secure they render the visible signal, and the Infantry AIRmechanized Company lands at the identical time with its Mini-Gavins and moves out as quickly as their vehicles are de-rigged. The analogy here is that of a "tail gate leap" the place the automobiles and men are delivered shut together by the identical aircraft. With Pathfinders on the bottom, they'll survey the LZ to assure its appropriate for airlanding. The Mini-Gavins are internally-loaded so CH-47Ds are free to fly a full pace flight profile to evade the enemy's detection. The whole point is getting the power on wheels and out of the open LZ hazard area lengthy earlier than enemy mortar/artillery hearth might be called in on them from their noise, mud, heat signatures. ASP-30mm Gas-operated Autocannon for a number of functions Videos: First video shows wonderful speedy cross-country mobility of M113 Gavin gentle tracked AFV and the way it can plow by way of water and swim. 30mm autocannon HEI round explosive effects proven. www.combatreform.org/asp30mmonM113GAVIN.wmv One in all the advantages of being fuel-operated instead of electrically fired like the M231 model on the AH-sixty four Apache is ASP-30mm will be removed from the air/sea/ground car and fired from a ground mount www.combatreform.org/asp30mmonTRIPOD.wmv The next unarmored wheeled trucks and dune buggy mounting of ASP-30 are not protected, cell or stable sufficient however included to show it is possible and the shaking and rolling of all the vehicle when firing signifies the recoil forces involved: www.combatreform.org/asp30mmonBSHUMVEETRUCK.wmv www.combatreform.org/asp30mmonFAVdunebuggy.wmv To show a little bit of the autocannon firepower now attainable, we've got this video gun camera footage from Iraq of a 224th Attack Aviation Battalion AH-sixty four Apache lighting up some Iraqi terrorists in delicate-skin trucks utilizing the M230 30mm autocannon. This cannon may also be mounted on M113 Gavin gentle tracked AFVs in an AV30 turret or a gas-operated ASP-30 model can be mounted on the present .50 caliber cupola. We may have such issues if we did not waste $BILLIONS on Strykers trucks. 30mm Chain Gun in action (MPA) file U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned (Call) reports in CHAPTER II: Universal and Enduring Techniques and Procedures to Support Tactical Operations in Afghanistan (Desert Environment) that during Desert Storm: "The 30mm gun techniques had been very lethal and destroyed targets at ranges out to 4 kilometers when correct. One T-seventy two turret (rear portion) was penetrated by 30mm HEDP rounds." A big benefit of the 30mm HEDP -isn't only will the one round do virtually all the pieces you want, however impact just isn't that dimished by vary. Adding programable priming (PP) would even additional increase versitility and penetration. Imagine a company of ASP-30mm armed M113A3 Gavins or BV-206S (M973A2 Ridgway armored SUSVs) hosing down a formation of T-72s, every gun firing 7-eight rounds per second. McDonnell Douglas was bought out by Boeing Phantom Works which has just lately been bought out by Alliant Technosystems (ATK) in Minnesota. We tracked down the ASP-30mm builders and received this info from them: Mr. Cal Calvert ATK Phantom Works (480) 324-8621 FAX: 8759 Cal writes: "The ASP-30 worked well, and it does fireplace the 30x113mm 30mm spherical which is what's most often referred to as the 'lightweight 30'. This has a lower time-of-flight than the 30 x 173mm A-10 Warthog spherical which known as the 'GAU-8' round. The big advantage of the lightweight 30 is the M789 HEDP round which is a shaped-charge twin-objective round. I do know I'm supplying you with information that you realize, however others might not. The key is that if the 789 round drops out of the air at any range (taking a bit of liberty right here) that will probably be just as efficient. In different words, it's not dependent on velocity to do its job, (again with some liberty, as its optimum effectiveness is 1200-1500 meters as best I can recall, that is because of the spin rate of the projectile and the fluting of the shaped charge liner). Now we have trialed the ASP-30 loads over the years. It worked effectively, however never discovered a house. It was viewed by some as too big, when in reality for a 30mm gun it was fairly small, however to not the users. So, we put it onto the shelf. It will take in my opinion the govt to get behind it and put the little remaining funding to this system to get it kind-labeled. We at all times ran into the prices, (everyone wished 10 models) and you recognize what occurs, it gets costly, after which folks couldn't afford this. MCD by no means wished to invest to get into the market (needed to get well all costs in the primary 10 units, you understand the type of pondering). The weapon works effectively and would do the job, we shall see, maybe we should assume about getting the govt involved once more, since now we have two 30mm shooters in this system now, our electrically-fired 30mm M230 (Apache gun) and our Mk44 USMC/USN 30mm x 173mm gun." Our reply: We need a lightweight Gas-OPERATED 30mm autocannon that may be rapidly removed and attached so a BV-206S can roll-on/roll-off inside a CH-47D helicopter. Ditto that for a M113A3 Gavin rolling on/off a C-130 Hercules STOL mounted-wing aircraft to include parachute airdrop procedures. The ASP-30mm can be dismounted and fired on a tripod, an vital capability for mild Air-Mechanized Infantry to get the most effective defensive and ambush positions possible. The electrically-operated 30mm weapons ATK makes is not going to DO for the helicopter-transportable gentle tracked AFV. However, the AV30 turret with the M230 will work on M113 Gavins that are transported primarily by fastened-wing aircraft parachute airdrop and airland: M113 Gavins in combat!: www.combatreform.org/m113combat.htm Essentially, CH-47s are too noisy to direct ship troops safely and these foot troops lack mobility to get fleeting enemies. Since CH-47s are noisy the enemy can simply chose to be lengthy gone by the time they land. Foot troops lack the mobility to catch up with enemies forewarned and extra cellular on foot via terrain familiarity and light private masses through caching supplies, horses and in decide-up trucks. What ground autos can go inside the CH-47? One of many "mysteries" of the CH-forty seven Chinook is whether it might probably carry a 85-inch large Humvee truck inside or not? General Maxwell Taylor's Army officer son, Tom Taylor wrote a book on the 101st in Desert Storm, called "Lightning on the Storm" detailing how they had To hold TWO unarmored Humvee trucks inside in the event that they have been going to conserve gasoline to make it to Forward Operating Base (FOB) Cobra, deep in Iraq. Dangling a pair of Humvees beneath the Chinook would trigger a number of aerodynamic drag and scale back pace and improve gasoline burn/scale back vary. The issue is that the Humvee drivers would have to be INSIDE their trucks and could not take a safer-for-egress-in-case-of-crash-landing bench seat position and get into their trucks shortly earlier than landing. It was "conflict" so the Fort Rucker and Lee "Safety Nazis" could possibly be over-ruled. The photographs under from Fred Pushies' excellent guide, "Night Stalkers: 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment" clearly prove a Humvee could be loaded into a CH-47, we gather with SEATS Removed. Out to the west in accordance with Pushies, Delta Force and the Rangers have been flying in Chenowth unarmored Fast Attack Vehicles (high RPM, tire floatation "dune buggies") by CH-47s to hunt for SCUD floor-to-floor missiles. However, after Desert Storm was over, the 101st reverted again to exterior sling-loading at Fort Campbell as soon as once more and knuckling underneath to the security nazis for a dubious finish-state. Yes, tying down and untying automobiles is extra work and causes the Chinook to be on the bottom longer than picking-up and dropping off an exterior sling-load. However, as many people have written in to us after studying our AMS ebook the place we show a M113 Gavin being sling-loaded by a CH-47D have stated; this slows the helicopter down and prevents it from utilizing evasive flight profiles to get terrain masking, making it vulnerable to enemy small arms fire, autocannon and surface-to-air missiles. Certainly, among the folks writing in to us have a hidden agenda to justify persevering with the feel-good lightfighter narcissists-walking-from-the-helicopter-dismounted-assault-close-to-or-on-high-of-the-goal non-sense. Funny, how when confronted with desert distances that can not be walked, both Delta, Rangers and the 101st can discover a option to internally load vehicles inside CH-47s---and C-130s and C-17s despite their "we-do not-need-autos" bravado. What is professionally negligent and harmful is that after these operations are over, at least the 101st refuses to be taught from them and permanently change themselves to have a "mounted" (I know its a curse word--you are actually a fats, out-of-form, "mech pussy") Air Assault functionality that comes from inside a CH-47 to maintain 3D maneuvers viable in mild of enemy air defenses and to improve their combat power on the bottom to not get caught into LZ X-Ray type situations or be relegated to mopping up in the wake of extra mobile floor items just like the 3rd Infantry Division with tracked armored fighting vehicles (AFVs). The 101st, in occupation obligation in Iraq, after many casualties driving round in highway-sure, unarmored and quasi-armored Humvee trucks is now utilizing cross-nation capable M113 Gavin gentle tracked AFVs and while before they wouldn't even be caught "dead" in one, now they demand they only journey in RPG-proof up-armored "Super Gavins". Details: www.geocities.com/armorhistory/airassaulttanksnoexcuse.htm The reality the nay-sayers don't need you to know is that INTERNALLY LOADING Ground Vehicles into CH-47s to get more mobility and firepower after the Air Assault just isn't solely attainable, however was once commonly executed in the U.S. Army. The drawing below from TM-55-1000-205-20-1 "AIR TRANSPORTABILITY PROCEDURES FOR M38A1C AND M151A1C 1/4-TON WITH MOUNTED 106-MM RECOILLESS RIFLES IN CH-forty seven HELICOPTER" [www.tpub.com/content/chhelicopters/TM-55-1000-205-20-1/] reveals how TWO small 4x4 jeep with 106mm recoilless rifles might easily loaded into a CH-47 with a mere 8 tie-downs per automobile. The jeep is a far smaller truck than the Humvee and you can easily walk by it in flight and take up a bench seat till required to drive it off...how do we know this? Well, as a result of we personal a CH-forty seven and a jeep and do it all the time for static assessments. The point we are making is that if there's a WILL to enhance Air Assault capabilities with tracked armored fighting autos---that has not been ruined by slim-minded, gentle infantry foot narcissism---There's a Way. We are able to cut back the width of the usual M113 Gavin which the Army has over 14, 655 in service---modifying some of the thousands sitting unused in storage--to be 85 inches extensive just like the Humvee truck---to fit inside CH-47s for improved 3D maneuvers. We suggest eliminating 1 street wheel of size to reduce weight, too so the CH-47 can carry more gas for higher vary. The truth is that there's more width contained in the CH-47 than the light narcissists will let you understand than the 90 inches revealed. If you are taking a tape measure you will notice that the ramp is indeed ninety inches huge. However, at the ramp hinge width will increase to 91 inches. With seats eliminated, you will note that the precise floor of the CH-47 extends out beyond the CARGO Floor'S ninety INCHES to 92 inches where the aircraft ribs be a part of to the actual backside. If you roll in an 85 inch large ground vehicle onto the Chinook's CARGO Floor, you actually have 3.5 inches of clearance on each facet of "wiggle room" for automobile overhang or a Soldier to squeeze by. If you aren't too chubby and aren't sporting LBE, you possibly can squeeze by and take off the car tie-downs before touchdown and get into the driver's seat to drive off. If you're carrying Just one M113 Mini-Gavin, and the infantry/spec ops troops are behind it on bench seats, the driver can climb in from the again troop door in the rear ramp to take up his driver's position. If you don't need a Soldier or two squeezing previous to undo the ahead tie-downs, you can have them sit IN Front OF the Mini-Gavin and do it upon landing or God forbid! somebody has to hussle---have 1 or 2 Soldiers bounce out from the entrance crew chief hatch and run around to the again of the CH-47 to undo the front tie-downs. All of this anal-retentivity-to-discover-an-excuse-not-to-do something-mandatory-as a result of-its-not-ego-gratifying, notwithstanding is absurd...this isn't launching an area shuttle. Certainly, an electrically launched tie down strap may very well be developed for the entrance of a Mini-Gavin to place an end to any of those concerns. The purpose is it may be accomplished and we're just not attempting as a result of we want to do the lightfighter BS we need to do---instead of the job America wants us to do--which is to get Bin Ladens (sub-national terrorists) which requires tracked AFV floor mobility beyond a foot slog with a hundred pounds of "lightweight" gear in your back. Solution: Shrink a M113 Gavin to roll-on/off from inside a CH-forty seven like the Lynx "M113 and a half" utilized by the Canadian and Belgan armies (see photo above). Propel by stealthy hybrid-electric drive and band tracks for 60 mph speeds and 600 mile vary on one tank of fuel. Instead of packing in 44+ foot sloggers per Chinook, carry 1 "Mini-Gavin" with 7 troops inside (Driver, Track Commander + 5 troops) that roll-off right into a COVERT landing zone exterior of enemy hearing/sight fight-prepared with superior armored mobility and firepower to then close in quickly and when contact is made with the enemy, overwhelms him not pinned down in a M16 versus AK47 evenly matched duel. Mini-Gavins ought to change the Humvee trucks in Delta weapons corporations and Scout, mortar, S&T platoons in HHC to render armored mobility for A, B and C firm infantrymen as wanted. But WHO Needs LZs in any respect? Why dwell with this handicap?

(1) Both cargo doors are locked in the open position.

Note: For arctic or other chilly weather operations or throughout flights of long duration, the cargo doors could also be closed and locked till the time specified for opening time. (2) The center row (9) troop seats are eliminated.. (3) Floor restraint provisions are offered to quick-rope personnel while aircraft is in flight. (Seat belts or CGU strap). (4) The quick-rope grasp or security extends the quick-rope bar and inserts the pit pin within the bar. (5) The quick-rope master inspects the bar for cracks and frays. (6) The quick-rope master rigs the fast rope to the fast-rope bar: Places one retainer machine on the quick-rope bar Slides fast rope onto the fast-rope bar Slides second rope retaining gadget onto the bar Installs the rope keeper pin into the quick-rope bar. MH-47E rear ramp FRIES hook up A 3rd MH-47E FRIES point is by the entrance fuselage rescue hoist c. Rigging of Fast Rope in Other Aircraft. CH-47, CH-46, RH-53, C/HH-53 use the identical kind of fast-rope bar only double when using the ramps (see Figure 6-6). d. Consideration for Safety. While in flight, the normal procedures for in-flight emergencies are used (see paragraph 6-2). Conducting fast-rope operations is harmful. Doing so with heavy masses requires LRS groups to be proficient in quick-rope operations. While executing the quick-rope operations, the following procedures are used. (1) Aircraft emergency.

Stop stick (cease quick-rope operations). Ensure ropers are clear. Take applicable motion. (2) Unsafe drift or premature lift-off.

Lock in. Stop stick. Get again on target. Continue operations. (3) Hung rope. Ensure ropers are clear. Descend aircraft. Release rope - use ground personnel to untangle rope from impediment. 4) No communications. Use hand signal to "stop stick" (clenched fist touching the chest). Use hand sign for "ropers" (pointing a finger toward the exit). Use hand sign for aircraft movement (open palm moved and confronted within the path required). Use hand sign to cease aircraft motion (clenched fist). Note: The last minute before "Ropes away" is a vital time. With the doorways open and the safety line is the one factor to carry on to, any sudden aircraft movement might throw personnel out of the aircraft. e. Fast-Rope Master Duties. (1) Brief members of his workforce and aircrew. (2) Inspect workforce members for applicable gear configuration and conduct briefback. (Work gloves, Sun, Wind, Dust Goggles (SWDGs) worn for eye protection, all gear tied down on personnel. Also inspection of aircraft rigging.) (3) Install the quick rope in the aircraft and conduct security checks. (4) Relay 10-minute, 6-minute, 1-minute, and 30-second time warnings to crew members. (5) Break chemical lights, if required. (Chemical lights are taped with one at anchor point, one at the bottom finish of the rope and one other five toes greater.) (6) Ensure rope is properly configured for deployment (back-fed to stop tangles). (7) Ensure team members are in order of exit before 1-minute warning. (8) Confirm goal on final method. (9) Deploy rope and ensure it is on the ground before ropers descend. (During evening operations, two chemical lights taped to the underside needs to be used.) (10) Deploy personnel utilizing the next warnings to the pilot: ROPE OUT--when fast-rope grasp deploys the rope over the target. ROPERS AWAY--when first roper exits on quick rope. ROPE CLEAR--informs pilot he is evident for flight. HOLD--informs pilot to hold place. Move, LEFT (Right, Forward, Back f. Execution of Fast Roping. Individual ropers should-- Understand all features of the insertion and emergency procedures. Ensure appropriate gear configuration to forestall snagging and accidents. Maintain an orderly and rapid exit formation. Grasp rope firmly before exit (do not bounce for the rope). On exit, rotate body ninety degrees to 180 degrees to clear the aircraft. Descend down the rope, controlling the pace and breaking two-thirds of the gap right down to keep away from touchdown on another individual. Upon landing, be prepared to execute a very good parachute touchdown fall, and move quickly away from the rope(s), keep away from the front of the aircraft. Consider particular person safety: --Each particular person is accountable for identifying hazardous conditions and inform the fast-rope grasp. --In the course of the quick roping, night time vision goggles will not be utilized by quick ropers, due to limited depth notion and a tunnel-imaginative and prescient effect. --During descent, ropers should maintain visible contact with decrease ropers and look ahead to obstructions. --Individual ropers will lock in throughout emergencies, by wrapping the rope One of many issues that damage on Oct 3, 1993 in Somalia was the fast Reaction Force (QRF) from the 10th Mountain Division (Light) was a conventional power that could not helicopter quick rope in to assist the surrounded Rangers and Delta pressure troops! The cell reserve should be capable to go exactly where the troops they are supporting can go. But the present mentality by DEFINITION is that only Pathfinders, 101st AA, 82d Airborne and SOF can fast rope. Regular infantry are not thought of "mature" enough to fast rope. In actual fact, a Squad Leader within the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) writes: "Sir, some units, LRSD and Pathfinder, quick rope rather a lot, however most models seldom do. In case you remember the accident involving 2 Blackhawks in July of 1996, that's what they were doing. They had been training rescuing downed aircrew and the 2 helos collided as they came to hover above position to deploy quick ropes. Since then the chance to fast rope has been decreased considerably and often solely the specialized items do it frequently. This is not to say that the road items do not do it sometimes, but very rarely." For additional proof, read the 101st Air Assault Division's "Green Book on-line on the link under: http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/army/docs/101st-goldbook/index.html Where is the quick rope and rappel insertion functionality within the 101st's SOP? If its not of their "playbook" how will it be used on "game day"? We now have a whole 101st Air Assault Division of college graduates that may do rappel/quick rope, yet we're not exploiting these individual skills to get an OPERATIONAL Capability to avoid dangerous, open space landing zones. Where IS THE Fast ROPE TTP Within the SOP ABOVE? Playing it "secure" in peacetime might reduce accidents and preserve careers, nevertheless it handicaps us in time of war after we can not do dangerous things wanted to realize the benefit we want on the battlefield to WIN and SAVE LIVES. We should avoid the pitfalls of the open LZ danger space. Every U.S. Army combat arms Soldier ought to know easy methods to rappel and quick rope from a helicopter right into a battle below. They rappel from a tower in fundamental, why not slide down a quick rope? Rigger's belts must be a part of the BDU as a substitute of the useless net belt so in an emergency males might be extracted by hovering helicopter, rappel and cross a rope bridge with a safety hook-up. Throughout the evacuation of Kham Duc in Vietnam, 2 CIDG Soldiers and a marine aviator tried to escape the advancing NVA by holding onto the skid of a departing UH-1 Huey helicopter, however fell to their deaths from a thousand toes. Had they been outfitted with a snap hyperlink, sling rope and even used their LBE to hook up to the skid, they might not have lost their grip and fell to their deaths. Tying a swiss seat with a sling rope needs to be a CTT Skill level 1 task. Swiss Seat tying sequence Hook-up Steps 1-4 Hook-up Steps 5-7 They must be educated/conditioned to climb up caving ladders into hovering helicopters and/or snap in to their Rigger's belts (BDU shirt tails tucked in) till the helicopter can land safely as well as hold on to slide down a quick rope. This implies bodily training must be Specific to fight duties, not Sports tasks like running, sit-ups and push-ups in t-shirt, shorts and operating shoes. We'd like total infantry BATTALIONS of the 101st Air Assault, 82nd Airborne inserting away from predictable LZs using FRIES, sufficient helicopters with Improved "I" bars have to be out there for this. This includes their Mini-Gavin floor automobiles from a helicopter exterior sling-load using diligent PATHFINDING techniques. On the very least light tracked AFVs are wanted on the bottom to give these forces higher firepower and mobility than the Vietnam "foot slog"--the first "AIRmechanized" capability. Getting out: how will we EXTRACT the males: FRIES, SPIES, STABO and Ladders What many don't notice is that the Fast Rope Insertion/Extraction System (FRIES)has extraction loops on the rope finish to hook up to 6 Soldiers per rope who put on a STABO or SPIE rig harness or in an emergency a swiss seat though the upright physique place of the STABO/SPIE harnesses is most well-liked. As far again as 1992, we were making an attempt to wake individuals as much as the fact that Fast Rope Insertion Extraction Systems means just that--that you simply can be pulled out of an area by carrying an acceptable body harness or having a "donkey tail" interface built-into your LBE vest. SPIE is a cargo line with "D" rings sewn to it that hangs from the center belly cargo hook of a helicopter. The SPIE harness is a T-10 parachute harness with a "Donkey tail" of sort XIII nylon with a loop to carry a snaplink/carabiner to connect to the cargo line "D" ring. A recon staff under fire could snap in shortly to the road lowered from the hovering helicopter right into a small opening in the jungle and be pulled out, but it was harmful and several other men died in Vietnam. Another downside to SPIE is its a harness with no patrol load bearing perform--dead weight and time loss beneath enemy fireplace to placed on. With FRIES, one system can be used for both insertion/extraction, simplifying logistics and the configuration complexity within the aircraft. The one draw back to FRIES is that throughout insertion the rope is usually dropped, and a ninety foot, 50 pound rope has no floor functions and is discarded at $1,000 a shot. No less than a rappelling rope can be utilized to cross rivers, descend cliffs and so forth. and is value recovering and carrying along on the mission. That is to speed the helicopter away from its susceptible place hovering. If the state of affairs permits the quick rope should be pulled in by the fast rope master/crew chief and thought must be thought of of a winch to reel the fast rope in--perhaps with the males connected. STABO is a modified Army inexperienced line rappelling rope which is hooked up to a donut ring on the ground or roof of the helicopter, then tossed down the the Soldier under in a deployment bag, one rope per man. The Soldiers put on a patrol load bearing suspenders that's life help succesful that has two "V" hooks that snaplinks to a bridle "Y" piece with a snap for the rope from the helicopter. 4 males at a time will be extracted as they tie a security rope to each other for extra insurance coverage. The downside to STABO is its leg straps aren't designed to tug away from the groin like a parachute harness and is extraordinarily uncomfortable when dangling from a helicopter. RAPPEL, LADDERS & WINCHES NEW! Rappel & Troop Ladder video www.combatreform.org/airmobilerappelndtroopladderinsertions.wmv Peter Brush writes: In early 1966, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) started massing forces within the northern provinces of South Vietnam, and the marines have been ordered north to face this threat. The area in the eastern Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) had been heavily infiltrated by the enemy. The 324B NVA Division had crossed the DMZ and was quite prepared to tangle with the marines. Reconnaissance patrols had been unable to remain in the field for greater than just a few hours -- and plenty of for less than a couple of minutes -- earlier than it was necessary to extract them beneath heavy enemy fire. A new part of the battle in Vietnam was about to begin.

If a recon team or infantry squad wants a helicopter to insert or extract them, its NOT a on condition that a helicopter can land to do this. The image above shows a CH-forty six that tried to land on a hilltop because the marines inside couldn't rappel and ended up tumbling down after losing its "footing". ALL troops that use helicopters must be able to use rappel/FRIES---if all you are able to do is walk on and off an airlanded helicopter and sit on a bench seat like the typical marine doing "heliborne" operations, you aren't doing something an untrained civilian does not do when he's evacuated in a NEO like on Grenada in 1983. Chest beating and hubris isn't authorized. From "On the Visions - A private Perspective" web site we now have photographic proof that in emergency ladders could be used as extraction means with men clipping their our bodies to them and dangling like in STABO & SPIE rigging. The profit is that with ladders you can as soon as out of immediate hazard CLIMB UP INTO THE HELICOPTER, pull within the ladder and get out of the generally dangerous Area quicker than having males continue to dangle below. Photo #4005 CH-forty six Ladder Extract Recon returning from a ladder extract An Hoa Comment by: John J. McNamara III on May 2, 2006 11:15 PM If this photo was taken on April 22, 1969 round 4:00pm and the Recon Team call sign was Asparagus III, I was the aircraft commander of Peachbush 3-2 and extracted the recon staff from the mountanins approx. 5-7 miles southwest of An Hoa. The recon crew was surrounded by an overwhelming NVA force. Best regards, John J. McNamara III HMM-263 (1968-sixty nine Marble Mountain) Small caving ladders just like the versatile ladders used in Vietnam can be used to re-enter a helicopter whereas it hovers, however its time-consuming and tiring. Hydraulic hoists/jungle penetrator outfitted helicopters can reel in at probably the most 3 males at a time, so it is an option for a small force, although time consuming. Integrated AIRCRAFT INSERT/EXTRACT MEANS & MOUNTAINEERING INTO LOAD BEARING Equipment The primary solution here is the C.O.M.E.T. Enterprises (one hundred and one E. Main St. Marshville, NC) Infil-Exfil Tactical Load Bearing Vest (TLBV) with STABO/SPIE/FRIES capabilities constructed into the Soldier's load bearing system. This has cut up-saddle legs straps for comfort and fold up when not needed. The last word resolution to the hovering insertion/extraction drawback to steer away from predictable, open LZs requires an entirely new aircraft built with this objective in mind. STEALTHY HEAVY Lift HELICOPTER WITH HOVER INSERT/EXTRACT Ability The primary answer is to AIRmechanize with a stealthy heavy raise helicopter that can elevate/decrease a whole intact recon team or infantry platoon and/or light AFVs. It might have a bomb-bay flooring which might lower to the bottom from a hover or vice-a-versa. www.combatreform.org/nextchinook.htm We don't have to wait 10 years and spend $10B to get a mythical "JHL" to do this; the S-64/CH-fifty four SkyCrane has 5 winches that cannot solely winch hundreds up and down from a hover, it may possibly Secure THE Loads SNUG Against ITS SKELETAL Body SO It may FLY AS Fast AND AS AGGRESSIVELY AS Possible. We will have the very best facets of sling-loading; not having to land and an ability to jettison loads whereas not having the bad side effects of sluggish, straight-line flight speeds that consumes huge amounts of fuel as a result of increased aerodynamic drag. Better of all, Erickson AirCrane makes NEW S-64s in the present day, so there isn't any excuse why HQDA would not buy 25-50 immediately to cease Talking about "Sea Basing" and start DOING it. Unless of course, the rotorheads like being fuked up, they like not being able to carry vehicles except by sling-loading so they've a constructed-in excuse to not fly into enemy territory.... MEET THE CH-54 SKYCRANE & ITS Multiple WINCH Systems There'll Always be a need for FRIES and rappel capabilities for smaller helicopters with out the particular reducing bomb-bay floor. With the flexibility to insert Anywhere on the map, the ground power with full foot and vehicular mobility fights the enemy as a combined arms crew, a full maneuver "participant" on the AIRLAND battlefield. This is where we will finish the "foot slogging" and LZ dependence plaguing Air Assault techniques. Better RECON AND PATHFINDING The NVA had "Head hunter" battalions--thats proper entire battalions that will sweep over the terrain to flush out all our recon types, LRRPS, MAVC-SOG, Force recon, you identify it. We by no means quite discovered the solution to that. The final word answer would be to wipe out their head hunters with our personal Rangers/Raiders simply as cellular on foot, more so with HPVs, better armed with light AFVs PLUS+ all of the fire help obtainable to U.S. armies. We should be prepared to combat for reconnaissance. So all that HOOAH! stuff: "scuba diving", small boats and so forth. and "parachuting" is essential to insert a LRS, SF SR staff at the very least without being detected, in any other case we end up running for our lives. Its not just causes to say "I'm higher than you". That "hi-speed PT" is helpful but once more arrogance blinds, it's not sufficient. We had studs in Vietnam. At finest we are speaking about 4-7 mph on foot. Again, not adequate. The newest ploy is to dispose of HUMINT entirely and rely on UAVs, however last yr's failed IDF naval commando raid showed that UAVs overflying an space can telegraph your intentions and end in you being ambushed. www.combatreform.org/squad.htm The answer? *Human Powered Vehicles (HPVs): HPVs for Recon work That can be carried folded on board helicopters, and render 10-25 mph. * Better stealth, using thermal camouflage fits and so forth. So as soon as on the bottom, the recon team is not detected by an enemy quickly shopping for evening vision devices (NVDs) on the open market. We may "Own the evening" at this time, however neighbors are transferring in next door. WHAT Happened AFTER VIETNAM? After Vietnam, the 101st merely replaced their brief-range M102 105mm towed howitzers with another quick-range 105mm howitzer, the M119 primarily based on the British gentle gun of 1982 Falklands battle fame. A lot for doing one thing original and advancing capabilities; if confronted with enemies with Vietnam-period M46 130mm guns, at the moment's "Air Assault" units if congregated in any type of laager or firebase might be smashed. The 101st took over the helicopter-mobile mentality. Meanwhile, 1st now not "Air" Cavalry transformed again to a heavy armored division, we had no dog car seat for large dogs. We had the https://dogwarmth.com/accessories/best-dog-car-seats-for-large-dogs/ where everyone thought the ATGM had "killed" the tank. With current generation U.S. tanks vulnerable to ATGMs, Armor branch went crazy to create an ultra heavy tank that would slug it out with the Soviets in Europe. They wanted an American clone of a German WWII "Tiger" tank.

What happened to Air Assault tactics?

THE BRASS: "The time appears at hand to extend our thinking to embrace a triplepurpose concept for ground combat operations in which counterinsurgency operations snd other types of U.S. military participation overseas in time of nominal peace are a normal third principal mission of the Army going hand-in-hand with nuclear warfare and conventional warfare." --General Harold K. Johnson, Military Review, February 1965 This quote also reveals how Krulak's "3-block war" of doing different things at same time (we're surprised he doesn't have a slogan for chewing gum and walking, too--"2-stick-of-gum operations") is total BS and such an "original" slogan (NOT). THE RANK & FILE: "I'm not going to destroy the traditions and doctrine of the United States Army just to win this lousy war." Sound familiar? "any good Soldier can defeat a guerrilla." Insert marine for Soldier if you like, same arrogance. www.leaderu.com/ftissues/ft0012/articles/garfinkle.html MORE: But is it too much to expect that General Westmoreland, General Earl Wheeler, and their staffs might have better understood their professional obligations in the face of a novel challenge? No, that is not too much to expect. It is not too much to expect a professional Soldier to put his country's interests above those of his service [hear that USMC?] or his personal reputation, and that was precisely the problem. Thanks to Nikita Khrushchev's famous speech about "wars of national liberation" as the new face of the anti-imperialist struggle, and to President Kennedy's conclusion that the United States needed to invest more resources into our capabilities to fight counterinsurgencies, a furious argument broke out in the early 1960s within the middle ranks of the U.S. Army. While some major figures, such as General James Gavin, supported Kennedy's view, most senior Army brass resisted it firmly. General George H. Decker, Army Chief of Staff from 1960 to 1962, summarized this view with the comment that "any good Soldier can defeat a guerrilla." The conventionalists "won" the bureaucratic wars [and killed 58, 000 Americans with their non-adaptive BS], and, as is the way of the world in such matters, their views hardened from having been subject to criticism. The conventionalists got promoted and, with those hardened views firmly implanted in their heads, rose to their places just in time to mismanage the war in Vietnam. Lind quotes an anonymous Army officer in Vietnam as saying, "I'm not going to destroy the traditions and doctrine of the United States Army just to win this lousy war." Such sentiment not only reflects Westmoreland's misguided devotion to conventional tactics in the face of an unconventional situation, but also the primacy the Army accorded doctrinal orthodoxy (and the professional egos attached to the doctrines) above all else. The American people had a right to expect better, and certainly deserved better. Which brings us back to Robert McNamara. Is it too much to have expected McNamara to have bucked the tide within the Johnson Administration as a whole and opposed the 1965 escalation? Yes, it is too much, and we would all be better off if McNamara ceased his self-flagellation over the point. But is it too much to have expected McNamara to put a stop to Westmoreland's disastrous direction of the war before the end of 1966? No, it is not too much, because that was his job. McNamara himself was one of those who dressed down General Gavin for wanting to develop anti-guerrilla tactics, and he gave Westmoreland the leeway to wreak maximum havoc. It was also McNamara the systems analyst, along with the senior Army brass, who became fixated with body counts and other conventional indicators of military success that mislead in unconventional contexts. If McNamara insists on contrition, fine; he has much for which to repent. Just let him get the reasons right. So right after Vietnam, where did this 3rd mission of COIN go in the Army's mind: the trash can labeled "Vietnam"---we don't do mountains and we don't do jungles.... Even though the TRI-CAP armor/helicopter experiment worked very well in tests, the conservative Army leadership went back to emulating WWII, perhaps they were excited about George C. Scott in the 1970 movie Patton? Everything that had to do with non-linear war Vietnam; the COIN/SASO internal war against the VC, the external closed terrain, jungle war against a clever infiltrating NVA had to be forgotten. Lust to relive linear war WW2 in open terrain became the rallying mentality. When the bloated Bradley medium female tank came along with oversized 2-man turret to smother the infantry in back, Soldiers who knew better warned that it was NOT a light tank able to operate boldly in closed terrain to be a cavalry mount or means of mobility for light infantry. The Army brass didn't care and still don't care that planet earth has closed terrain that is no-go for wheeled trucks and medium to heavy tracks...it was like the Korean and Vietnam wars had never happened. General Gavin's warning to not be road bound in his 1954 Harper's magazine article were ignored AGAIN. As was General Walker's more direct order: "GET OFF THE ROAD. Our Army is too damn roadbound" Deja Road-Bound U.S. Army, All-Over Again, Begs for another replay of Task Force Smith John M. Carland in his INSTITUTE OF LAND WARFARE paper for the ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY Arlington, Virginia, No. 42 MAY 2003, "How We Got There: Air Assault and the Emergence of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), 1950-1965" writes: In the Korean conflict, American combat units lacked cavalry. Armor units, no matter what their unit designation, were too heavy and road-bound to be considered cavalry. Therefore, American forces were more likely to arrive on the battlefield "lastest with the leastest" than the more desirable "fustest with the mostest." Major General James M. Gavin, a senior officer with extensive airborne experience in World War II, vigorously made this point in his seminal piece of writing, "Cavalry-and I Don't Mean Horses," in 1954. He argued that America's lack of true cavalry in its military provided the common thread in explaining the nation's military defeats in the Korean War's early months. When North Korean forces invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950 and achieved almost complete surprise, what South Korean and American forces needed most was time to regroup and properly assess their predicament. How to do this? "The tactical situation called for a cavalry force," Gavin believed, "to be committed at once, to screen and delay, while the heavier infantry and armored forces built up a more substantial defense." However, the United States/Republic of Korea force possessed no cavalry worth its name and therefore nothing to commit. Then, on 15 September 1950, America turned the tables with the Inchon landings. At first, the American ploy succeeded brilliantly and North Korean forces disintegrated. "The situation screamed," wrote Gavin, "for highly mobile cavalry forces to exploit this unprecedented opening." Such forces could have moved quickly south to the Naktong River line to trap the North Koreans between the American units breaking out of the Pusan Perimeter and the cavalry moving toward them Instead [he concluded], we took almost two weeks. . . . When the first breakout of our forces from the southern perimeter moved northward, it was a combined tank-truck column, essentially an infantry column limited in its performance by its road-bound equipment. A cavalry arm-"airlifted in light planes, helicopters and assault-type aircraft"-to pursue the enemy and exploit the situation did not exist. A "debacle . . . a tragic chapter in our history" was the sad consequence. Next, on 26 November 1950 thirty Chinese divisions achieved "complete and overwhelming surprise" against the United Nations force that, as a result, suffered a terrible defeat. Again, that there was no cavalry to reconnoiter and gather intelligence explained precisely why the Chinese could surprise the Americans.8 Gavin attributed these failures to the "deification of heavy equipment" in World War II. American military leadership had deluded itself into believing that "heavy armor is cavalry." Consequently, noted Gavin, "we lost the cavalry when we mounted it in weighty tanks and trucks, all of which move (if the terrain will allow them to move at all) at exactly the same speed as motorized infantry, if not slower." He proposed that it might be possible to regain battlefield mobility and mobility differential through the use of assault transports such as light utility planes, helicopters, or convertiplanes.9 Through his article, Gavin made a significant contribution to the history of air assault warfare. In advocating the reintroduction of an effective cavalry element into the land forces of the U.S. Army, he provided intellectual and practical legitimacy to helicopter warfare enthusiasts who, later in the decade, desired to develop the helicopter as an armed combat cavalry vehicle and to devise accompanying tactical concepts. We hope most of the readers would parachute out of a plane to gain 3D positional advantage if asked to do so. The following remarks are directed at those who are not even willing to sit on a bench seat in a helicopter to get 3D advantage, much less parachute in. Its also directed at today's phonies in Stryker trucks who say they are C-130 air transportable when their wheeled mounts are too heavy, and are disgustingly just as road bound as we were in Korea---actually as 20-ton thinly armored boxes rolling on air-filled rubber tires, more so. Our thesis is that current American mounted warfare is also a form of "posturing" going through the motions of fighting but not really fighting except when in the cover-less desert where we can kill the enemy from the safety of our armored cocoons or if we are light narcissists, comfortable wheeled trucks on paved roads and hard-pack trails from afar. Perhaps by going to too-heavy AFVs like the M1/M2 we have created a built-in automatic excuse so Armor branch will never have to fight in jungles again, you certainly don't see any tracked AFVs in the 25th LID anymore. General Don Starry and company certainly knew light tanks/AFVs were fantastic in Vietnam---perhaps they thought by going to heavy AFVs they could insure they wouldn't have to fight where infantry dismounted action would run the show? We'd love to interview these Army leaders that made these decisions and find out. Did they really think a 33-ton BFV is going to be as terrain agile as a light, low-ground pressure M113 rumbling over the rice paddies in Vietnam? If they do, they are truly idiots, but I doubt that. We think the Army--particularly Armor branch deliberately made itself too heavy so it wouldn't have to fight a [non-linear, difficult] "Vietnam" again just WW2 re-enactments against the Soviets that ill never happen. This frees the day for garrison "From Here to Eternity" BS games. Just like the marines deliberately land-lock themselves and ship-deploy just token evacuation/saber rattling forces, all the while by spending as much tax-payer money as possible. If the shoe fits, wear it. They are living by Dr. Dixon's predictions that all volunteer militaries are populated by phony, egomaniacs and weak, economic co-dependants not warriors who want to get the job done. The failure of aviation/infantry/artillery to defeat the VC/NVA in Vietnam without taking too many casualties---resulted in leaders in the Army to resort to 2D heavy, armored cocoon mounted warfare oriented towards European confrontation against the Soviets in open terrain. If we have a problem we can't solve, IGNORE IT, maybe it will go away? So instead of FIXING Airborne/Air Assault 3D maneuver units by giving them numerous air-deliverable light AFVs which would solve their vulnerability/firepower/ground mobility problems these heavyists who we suspect are "legs" (meaning unwilling to take personal risks by flying in aircraft=cowards) that are anti-3D maneuver because they think they can make up for this lack of 3D maneuver-gained-positional-advantage by extremely heavy armor protection/firepower that limits them to just 2D maneuver routes. A 2D force so heavy it cannot rapidly deploy strategically to be relevant in a world that moves by the speed of the AIR is a force that sits in the motor pool and watches the fight on CNN as the light narcissists---who refuse to use M113 Gavin and other light tracked tanks that would often win the fight for them handily----can get to where the action is and get themselves killed and wounded in wheeled trucks and on foot for glorious self-validation. Heavyists want low/no risk warfare and think that those positions ahead that threaten them can be controlled by "deep fires" and thus they don't have to take any risks by flying forces ahead (cavalry) to control this ground (3D maneuver). This is the "deep strike" mentality prevalent in the Army today because it thinks war is just killing and killing is firepower. These folks do not understand to control ground you need forces on the ground; and this means not relying on distant fires to do this. Controlling ground locally with close fires/patrolling is sound, trying to control ground miles and miles away with just the eyes of a robot plane or vehicle is madness. By being heavily mounted, they think they are so impervious to fires they can just stampede ahead without ill effect. Don't they see the repeated failures at NTC every time this is tried? Tracks themselves are not Chobham armored--once BlueFor stampedes into a minefield kill zone its over. Heavyists are living on technotactical borrowed time as top-attack missiles are coming that will pierce their vehicle roofs that don't have 4 feet of Chobham/DU armor. A smart enemy will not let their fuel trucks travel down roads to refuel these heavy gas-guzzlers, either. We know this is cruel and not "politically correct"; but we think it boils down to personal cowardice. (We call them as we see them) 3D maneuver requires movement inside aircraft and the 2D heavyists are afraid of flying. Yes, some aircraft will crash in peacetime and some of us are going to die. But the more numerous lives we will have saved in war will make it worth it. Don't believe us? Order everyone at Fort Knox to go to jump school or they will be discharged and see what happens. Are we saying they are lesser Soldiers? Yes, we are. General Gavin said: "Show me a man who will jump out of an airplane, and I'll show you a man who will fight". If you are not willing to do WHATEVER IT TAKES to win a war, to include risks in peacetime and to do WHAT IS SMART THAT WILL WIN THE FIGHT BUT NOT BE EGO GRATIFYING to have a 3D maneuver capability, you are a coward and a phony. If Generals want to shoot shells at map coordinates and assume they are under our "control" are posturing cowards, too. When our 2D forces come by these terrain areas and the enemy is there, the junior officers/enlistedmen will pay for it with their lives. The only guy who is really got the pressure on in mounted warfare is the Driver; everyone else can relax and enjoy the ride. Its the worse kind of Fort Knox BS mentality possible, a lot of General Shinseki's "transformation" opposition sadly emanates from Armor types who are scared to fly in aircraft when it should be opposition to being in a road bound armored car in order to be light enough to fly in USAF aircraft when you can have a better, x-country capable tracked AFV that is so efficient with its weight that its Army helicopter transportable, too. Be against road-bound wheels not 3D deployability and battlefield maneuver. 3-DIMENSIONAL MANEUVER INTERNAL DEFENSE: Hop (airland) & Drop (parachute) of Light Mechanized Forces Clearly, passing on our short range artillery firebase + helicopter + slow afoot infantry CONcept of Operations (CONOPS) was too much fuel/maintenance for the South Vietnamese Army to afford and was not decisively superior to the enemy NVA's long range artillery + highly foot mobile infantry with RPGs (supplies cached) + tracked tanks formula. The ARVN could not expel the NVA from their country, so the latter crept up to the firebases and smashed them with long-range 130mm artillery fire, causing a retreat, then a panic and collapse that led to the fall of South Vietnam. The firebases themselves were make-shift, ad hoc affairs thrown together. www.geocities.com/strategicmaneuver/battleboxes.htm The 1st Air Cav needed two MONTHS to build their forward operating base in Vietnam from scratch! Notice the sprawling An Khe FOB is a clusterfuck of vulnerable static buildings. VIDEO: www.combatreform.org/airmobileSTATICBUILDINGSinefficient.wmv You know the drill. We are supposed to be ready-to-fight, STRAC, etc. etc. However, we are not if we need to build static buildings and air bases, and they are FLIMSY and vulnerable to enemy commando, rocket, mortar and artillery attacks. Look at the pathetic fabric TENTS and wooden buildings our troops lived in during the Vietnam war, is it a wonder we lost 58, 000 dead? Our troops deserved better then and they deserve better N-O-W. If 1st Air Cav had been ISO containerized in BATTLEBOXes they would have been combat-ready in 2 DAYS after arrival. And they would have been HARDENED by earth fill, sand bags, concrete (Old Ralph Zumbro trick: mix in with sand let rain do rest) etc. and even underground to withstand even the heaviest NVA bombardments. Once you have a rigid metal shape you can do miracles of combat fortifications... The weight of the hundreds of 30 pounds each sand bags alone could collapse these make-shift "bunkers". If you do not have a solid structural shape and try to erect shapes out of flimsy WOOD that soaks up rain, moisture and BURNS you are going to waste $$$$ millions upon millions of dollars, countless hours of time better spent defeating the enemy and doing civic action for the civil populace, and when all is said and done you are still living in a shit-hole for a dwelling (hot, dirty, can't keep rain out) THAT DOES NOT PROTECT YOU AND YOUR MEN. "Half-Assed" is being charitable for a description. There was not only a better basing but a better fighting formula to defend the vast distances of South Vietnam we could have passed on to the ARVN based on simpler fixed-wing aircraft delivering the one type of force they seemed to fight well in: the M113 Gavin mechanized force. Time and time again, after Ap Bac, the light infantry NVA would bump up against the ARVN M113 mech force bristling with gunshielded machine guns and they'd be trounced. The American 1st/101st and 173rd Airborne Brigades were flown by USAF fixed wing planes into short airstrips dotting the countryside to operate as Forward Operating Bases (FOBs). Fixed-wing STOL/airdrop capable planes can fly much faster (over 300 mph) and farther (1, 000+ miles) and are more quiet than short-range, noisy VTOL helicopters. USAF Colonel Bowers writes in the Air University Review, November-December 1974; www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1974/nov-dec/bowers.html "USAF Airlift and the Airmobility Idea in Vietnam": Among the earliest American brigades entering Vietnam were two paratroop units, each with a historic tradition of partnership with the tactical airlift arm. The 173d Airborne Brigade, long stationed in the Pacific, moved from Okinawa in a 142-sortie C-130 stream during 5-7 May 1965. The 1st Brigade/101st Airborne Division arrived by sea at Cam Ranh Bay on 29 July. General William Westmoreland, Commander of MACV (including all U.S. forces in Vietnam), envisioned the two airborne brigades as strategic reserve forces, available for offensive or reaction operations throughout the country. Both were employed essentially in this way: deploying every few weeks to fresh operating areas, returning periodically to base camps for rest and retrofit. Both became well-practiced in airmobile assault methods, working with non-organic helicopter companies attached on mission basis or for extended periods. Most tactical operations were staged at forward airheads, usually C-130 or C-123 airstrips that were natural transshipment points for resupply. A typical airhead might contain a Forward Support Area unit (stocking several days of supplies), the brigade command center, perimeter defense forces, helicopter refueling and loading facilities, and artillery firing positions. Field operations could be easily staged within a radius of at least 20 miles from the airhead location, featuring multiple heliborne troop movements and fire from several outlying artillery fire support bases. In planning movements and resupply efforts to these airheads, Army logisticians exploited fixed-wing transports, helicopters, ground vehicles, and, occasionally, water craft. Shifts over distances greater than 50 miles were usually performed by the C-123 and C-130 fleets exclusively. For shorter moves, considerations included the condition and security of roadways, desire for speed and surprise, and the availability of helicopters and trucks. After a move in summer 1965 by C-130 and C-123 to the Pleiku region, the 173d returned to base camp at Bien Hoa, to begin a series of offensive endeavors, increasingly in partnership with the USAF airlift arm. For the penetration into the Iron Triangle region north of Saigon in early October, initial movement was by road. Subsequent resupply was by air, to avoid ambush by an alerted enemy. Since the forward supply point lacked a satisfactory airstrip, the air LOC rested upon C-123 airdrops, low-level extraction delivery by Caribous, and helicopters. The brigade had initially planned to receive eight C-123 (or four C-130) resupply deliveries daily by the extraction method but was surprised to learn that the ships and crews in Vietnam lacked this relatively recent delivery capability. The operation featured a five-ship C-123 airdrop to an isolated unit of the 173d in critical need of resupply. All five ships received battle damage in repeated passes at 400 feet-tactics made necessary by the small dimensions of the available drop zone. Transportation patterns varied in subsequent forays. Operation NEW LIFE-65, for example, commenced with a helicopter assault into a dirt strip, 40 miles east of Bien Hoa, on 21 November 1965. The first C-130 landed within one hour, followed by the arrival of 70 more 130s in the next 36 hours, each delivering troops or cargo. Overland LOC became established on the third day, allowing reduction of the C-130 resupply to about ten sorties daily. After several comparable ventures north and west of Saigon, the brigade on 10 April 1966 commenced Operation DENVER, its first all-air LOC effort. The four-day unit move to Song Be, 50 miles north of Bien Hoa, was handled without difficulty. Troops, vehicles, artillery, and supplies were hauled in 129 C-130 sorties. For two weeks the brigade operated about the Song Be airhead, staging numerous lesser movements by helicopter and receiving an average of 60 tons daily by air resupply into Song Be. In later years the Song Be strip became a focal point for supporting allied forces in the border area. Dak To FOB: note the long runway for C-130s Yet more spectacular was the Vietnam odyssey of the 1/101st. During the spring and summer of 1966, the brigade made five successive moves to new operating areas, each of them entirely by USAF airlift. Each shift required some 200 C-130 lifts, and each operation was subsequently sustained largely by air resupply. The brigade moved from Tuy Hoa to Phan Thiet in early April, to the highlands strip at Nhon Co late in the month, north to Cheo Reo in May, to Dak To soon afterwards, and finally to Tuy Hoa in July. The operations at Nhon Co and Cheo Reo were complicated by the rough and deteriorating airstrips and the doubtful adequacy of smudge-pot lighting for night landings, but no aircraft were lost in accidents. Ground fighting was occasionally sharp-at Nhon Co in May and Dak To in July. Tactical mobility and supply redistribution about each airhead was mainly by helicopter. Both brigades retained parachute proficiency. Paratroop assaults were occasionally planned (for example, in NEW LIFE-65), but none were performed until Operation JUNCTION CITY. In that 1967 venture, a battalion from 173d jumped almost simultaneously with multiple helicopter assaults, staged over a wide region. The parachute assault thus served the modest purpose of enlarging the assault force beyond that transportable by available helicopters. After the jumps, the C-130s made cargo drops, for several weeks resupplying elements positioned along the Cambodian border. In the final stages of JUNCTION CITY, the 130s sustained an American infantry brigade in "floating" operations over the operational area, making daily drops into newly designated drop zones. The airdrop and extraction capabilities thus were confirmed useful assets, with their greater applications in Vietnam yet ahead. The JUNCTION CITY assault remained the only significant American paratroop operation of the war, however. Nevertheless, by 1966 the ability of a relatively small number of C-130s to move brigades to relatively primitive forward airstrips and sustain them over several weeks of operations appeared proven. First Infantry Division and the Saigon plain By spring 1966, five American conventional infantry brigades (three of them belonging to 1st Infantry Division) operated from base camps about Bien Hoa and Saigon. Periodically, these units moved out for multibattalion sweeps, usually into the region between Saigon and the Cambodian border, seeking to attrite the enemy's forces and force him away from the capital city. Helicopters and fixed-wing transports gave heavy support to these operations, in effect achieving airmobility for units not organized or equipped for movement by air. The earliest ventures rested heavily on road transport for movements to forward bases, supplemented by Caribou, Chinook, and USAF lift. The C-123s operated into the base camp strips and into many of the regional forward strips. C-130s were seldom used because few improved strips were available. Air Force CH-3 craft of 20th Helicopter Squadron augmented scarce Chinooks in displacing artillery and making deliveries to field units. Troop assaults were performed exclusively by the UH-1Ds; use of CH-3s in this role was unauthorized. Operation BIRMINGHAM, the four-week invasion of Tay Ninh province, was launched 24 April 1966 and involved all three brigades of 1st Division. Movement to the operational area was entirely by air. Planning initially called for delivery of five infantry battalions, five artillery batteries, and two brigade headquarters, all in 75 C-130 loads on D-day. Concern for possible saturation at the 4600-foot laterite dirt strip just west of Tay Ninh caused changes: some units were positioned by C-123 at two dirt strips (Soui Da and Dau Tieng) east of Tay Ninh. On D-day morning the initial four C-130s arrived at Tay Ninh in close trail formation, landing with textbook precision at 30-second intervals and depositing 400 troops. During the first day, C-130s made a total of 56 sorties into Tay Ninh, with none of the feared congestion. Flights originated from the base camp strips (Lai Khe, Phu Loi, and Phuoc Vinh). Weather was ideal; the only delays came from several instances of tire damage. Ground fire hit one ship, wounding two men. Army logistics officers had forecast an air resupply requirement into Tay Ninh of 465 tons daily. During the first six days, through 30 April, a daily average of 424 tons was actually flown into Tay Ninh. Landings went on around the clock, flare pots and portable lamps providing runway illumination for reduced operations during darkness. Although substantial, the air line of communication was insufficient to meet the unexpectedly high artillery consumption, and a land LOC was opened to Tay Ninh on 1 May. Tonnages hauled after that date by road convoy approximated the amounts airlifted; the 130s continued hauling most of the POL to Tay Ninh because of bridge limitations for large POL road carriers. Heavy rains necessitated closure of the road LOC on 8 May, and resupply for the rest of the operation was again entirely by air, despite runway deterioration caused by the rain. Upon return of the last units to base camps on 17 May, the Air Force reported that a total of 679 C-130 and 266 C-123 sorties had supported the operation, lifting 9500 troops and 9700 tons of cargo. Meanwhile, Caribou courier craft linked each base camp with Tay Ninh, averaging 14 sorties daily, under operational control of the 1st Division. As in past ventures, supply distribution to field units, as well as tactical movements and assaults out of the forward airhead, were by Army helicopters. The infantry counted destruction of numerous Communist supply caches along the Cambodian border but had brought to battle only a single enemy battalion. Land and air transport modes were meshed in further operations of the infantry brigades. Air Force C-123s were active in the summer 1966 EL PASO series in the Loc Ninh and An Loc region north of Saigon. Typically, artillery ammunition was airlifted from Bien Hoa to one of four C-123 airstrips in the border region, for further distribution by helicopter to firing positions. Despite seasonal wet weather and marginal landing fields in the operating area, over 1000 C-130 and 5000 C-123 sorties supported the four-month effort. Operation ATTLEBORO in November featured now-familiar divisions of effort: C-130s again delivered into Tay Ninh, C-123s into Dau Tieng, sustaining forward support area supply activities at the two airheads. Dau Tieng, exclusively under air resupply, received a daily average of 37 C-123 and eight Caribou sorties, delivering principally POL from Tan Son Nhut and rations and munitions from Bien Hoa. The foremost mission, however, remained an assuredly "tactical" one-the airlanded movement and resupply of Army units into forward airstrips. Fundamental in this evolution was the flexibility of the Army's logistical system, which allowed supply redistribution to take place at the natural transshipment point between the fixed-wing and helicopter modes. Noteworthy also were the efforts of the engineers in upgrading and maintaining the necessary airstrips. As a result, the USAF airlift arm became a crucial element, strengthening the ability of the Army's airmobile, airborne, and infantry brigades to seek out and destroy enemy forces. Further, the ability of the allies to shift forces by air into (or out of) regions of enemy buildup permitted wide economy of defensive forces. Thus, the American offensives battered the enemy in areas once safe, meanwhile threatening those remaining sanctuaries. The Communist leadership, seeing the hopelessness in these developments, decided on a new strategy, resulting in the general offensive of Tet 1968. There was no reason why we couldn't have built the ARVN around M113 Gavin light tracked armored fighting vehicles that are easy to maintain and sip on fuel compared to turbine engined helicopters, and moved them all around the countryside by fixed-wing C-130s. A Pathfinder element with a bulldozer rigged to drop on an airdrop platform by cargo parachutes would be inserted first into the intended FOB runway and secure it, mark it and improve it with the bulldozer if necessary in advance of the main body. Scroll up to the XVIII Airborne Corps' uses of a stretch of road made into an airfield during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. If the tactical situation requires greater surprise, the ARVN force would be able to parachute in. The entire ARVN Paratroop Division should have been equipped with M113 Gavins. Once on the ground, these Light Mechanized ARVN forces would fan out and keep the NVA at the very least, off-balance if not pushed out of their country using the Security Creating Maneuver (SCM) tactic. The ARVN Light Mech or "MIKE" mobile Force (either straight-leg mech infantry or ARVN paratroopers) would move into the contested area carrying all the supplies it needed for several days at a time and hold the ground until driving back or even flying back to the FOB. Resupply if needed would be by the C-130s or smaller aircraft like the C-123. Observation/attack would be by the marvelous and amazing 6, 000 pound empty but able to fly at 15, 000 pounds A-37 Dragonfly 2-seater jet. Hop & Drop for the Future What a C-130 pilot sees from the air before landing... Just so you know this isn't an academic exercise, what we are talking about is adopting the Hop & Drop CONOPS for American allies like the new Afghan Army and Air Force; which now have M113A2 Gavins. The American light infantry in Afghanistan should get upgraded M113A3 Gavins to become the first MIKE force. The C-130 Hercules is a difficult plane to maintain, but we have older E models that are available for free to supply to them. With adequate effort the Afghans could master maintaining and flying their own C-130s. Since the amazing A-37 is no longer in production, the escort observation/attack aircraft would be a squadron of new purchase, AY-65 Vigilante 2 armored, two-seat crop dusters www.combatreform.org/killerbees3.htm. Therefore, we propose an Afghan C-130 and Vigilante 2 squadron be stood up to support initially an American M113A3 Gavin MIKE force in our hunt for Al Queda and Taliban terrorists. Then, we train an Afghan Army M113A2 Gavin MIKE force to airland and airdrop themselves to maintain internal defense of their country. Today, we have rapid soil sealants called Envirotac II (aka "Rhino Snot") www.envirotac.com that can be sprayed from a water buffalo trailer to make instant assault landing runways that did not exist during the time of the ARVN. We also have digital map imagery to do "virtual pathfinding" to discreetly set up a series of small dirt strips all over Afghanistan to support future MIKE force operations. The M113 Gavin MIKE forces can be picked up by C-130s or if they are specially reduced size "Mini-Gavins" inside American CH-47 Chinook helicopters. ITS NOW ITS OWN "BRANCH": SO WHAT IS WRONG WITH U.S. ARMY HELICOPTER AVIATION? Where did the 11th Aviation AH-64 Brigade get the idea to deep attack in OIF? Why, from Operation Desert Storm in 1991! Attacking forces fleeing Kuwait (if any) is NOT the same as slamming into an intact Iraqi armored division....They got away with it in DS and ASS U ME d they could in OIF, FUBAR, huh? (Map from Rick Atkinson's book "Crusade") Thus, 4 decades after Vietnam, the current Army "transformation" has no role for Army aviation other than "ash and trash" missions and lusting for deep attack missions as a junior version of the try-to-win-wars-by-aircraft-bombing USAF. Many Army rotorheads are content with this safe role. Thanks to TF Hawk's woes in Albania, and the disastrous 11th Aviation Brigade AH-64 deep attack against an Iraqi armored division in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003, faith in even heavily armored/armed Apache helicopter gunships flying alone into enemy territory as a "separate maneuver element" is at an all-time low. The Russians in Chechnya have not had a lot of helicopter success, either. The essential problem is that Army Aviation has forgotten that ground maneuver wins wars and has become fixated with their own helicopter gunship mentality that's really an Army green version of "fighter-bomber jock syndrome" long associated with the USAF. If you are going to copy the USAF at least copy their all-gray paint scheme so we don't lose aircrew getting shot down ie; copy what's good not what's bad. This took place when Army Aviation became its own branch and became in essence its own bureaucracy seeking selfish instead of combined-arms goals. To fix this, the Army should force the TRANSPORT parts of Army Aviation into the transformation process by insisting that Armored Fighting Vehicles are used that can be transported by Army helicopters for an Air-Mech-Strike capability. Army helicopters and scouts should be used for Close Air Support (CAS) not their own prove-they-can win-the-war-by-themselves missions. USAF A-10s should be forced to deploy alongside Army helos in the Assault Zone (AZ) not be held back in the rear with the other USAF planes operating from secure concrete runways. The "Cactus Air Force" so successful in WWII must return, service bickering be damned. The Army's AH-1s and UH-1s should not be thrown away nor their pilots---but transformed into the world's first "RoboCobra" Unmanned/Manned Close Air Support (UCAS) aircraft that would be flown by men in low threat environs and over populated areas and remotely in high threat areas. The lessons from TF Hawk and Chechnya is to have expendable UCAS aircraft locate the enemy not just create expensive digital, stealthy Scout helicopters like the RAH-66 Comanche and the Russian KA-50 Black Shark. We also need to stop being snobby and bring back enlisted pilots and provide ground FACs to control Army helicopter attack missions. A must read concerning the role of helicopters is the report below on Russian Air Operations in Chechnya: http://www.amina.com/article/thomas_mili.html www.milparade.com/1999/34/030.htm Issue 34. July - August 1999 SHIELD AND SWORD Grigory Kuznetsov, Candidate of Sciences (Technology) Grigory Kuznetsov, retired colonel, candidate od sciences (technology), was in charge of the trials of the Mi-4A helicopters armed with the K-4V weapon system, and Mi-24D, Mi-24V, Mi-28 and Ka-50 combat helicopters. Combat helicopters designed to provide fire support for friendly troops on the battlefield have virtually perpetrated a revolution in the tactical employment of armored and mechanized forces. By various estimates, the helicopters emerged victorious in various battles at a rate of 1:14, and even 1:20. This situation called for urgent equipment of armored units with both air defense artillery and surface-to-air missiles (ADA and SAM, respectively) to repel attacks of helicopters. Fig. 1. AD area A mobile point air defense (AD) system has been developed to protect units while on the defensive, on the march, and in combat formations on the battlefield. Schematically, it can be viewed as an inverted umbrella. For a schematic representation of a radial cross-section of the protective zone of such an AD shield for modern ADA and SAM systems see Fig. 1. Shown at 1 and 2 in the figure are possible positions of the combat helicopter for direct contact with ADA and SAM systems as well as armor materiel for their detection, identification and attack. Shown at the top is the permissible time of its flight within the ADA and SAM coverage, which depends on the distance to the helicopter; upon expiration of this lapse of time it can be destroyed with a probability close to unity. Thus, the armor supremacy, once disturbed by combat helicopters, has been restored with the emergence of the powerful "shield". Now, army aviation tacticians and rotorcraft designers again face the complex problem of penetrating the point AD system. To attack even a preliminarily reconnoitered target, a strike helicopter has to first enter the AD coverage area for its detection and identification, which takes a certain length of time. Therefore, if a decision to attack an armored target 4 km away (the joint ADA and SAM coverage) is made, combat helicopters, types Mi-24, Ka-50, Ka-52 (Russia) and AH-64 (USA), will have only a few seconds to take aim, fire and then disappear behind cover or a screening obstacle. A combat helicopter attacking a target at a range of up to 4 km can only use unguided aircraft rockets and guns with an aiming and firing time of 2 to 3 seconds. It is impractical to launch antitank guided missiles (ATGM) from ranges closer than 4 km, since the time required for their preparation and guidance is almost twice as long as the command and loading time of the ADA and SAM systems. The effective sighting range of rockets and guns of the Mi-24 and AH-64 helicopters is 1.5 to 2 km. This means they have to come dangerously close to the AD systems in every attack. The Ka-50 and Ka-52 helicopters are in a more advantageous position when rockets and guns are used, since they are armed with more powerful (80 and 122mm) rockets and a gun and outfitted with a sighting system with a range of up to 4 km. Fig. 2. Tactical operation of combat helicopter using ATGMs It should be said that the point AD systems have fully stripped the Mi-24 and AH-64 helicopters of their capability of attacking counterair-covered targets from a range of 2 to 4 km. An SAM system permits a combat helicopter to stay in the AD coverage area without impunity for only 15 to 20 seconds to detect and attack a target from a range of 4 to 6 km. In terms of the total time required for target detection and identification, aiming, ATGM launch and guidiance, the employment of ATGMs by all existing strike helicopters from the aforementioned ranges is like balancing on the brink of a foul play, to speak in the sports language. The Mi-24, Ka-50 and Ka-52 helicopters are in a better position with respect to the AH-64, because the domestic Shturm, Ataka and Vikhr ATGMs markedly surpass their American counterpart, the Hellfire missile. The tactics involving the use of ATGMs (rockets and guns) against counterair-covered armor materiel is illustrated in Fig. 2. To substantially (almost by one half) reduce the AH-64 stay time in the AD coverage area, used to guide the Hellfire missile from the instant of launch till impact, considerable hopes are pinned on the OH-58D reconnaissance helicopter or ground-based laser illuminators. In this case, the AH-64 helicopter controls an ATGM till the instant the seeker locks onto the laser spot of the illuminated target, following which, the helicopter quickly leaves the AD coverage area. However, the reliability for the practical realization of this tactics is doubtful, because both the reconnaissance helicopter and ground-based laser illuminators are limited in range. As a result, every time they have to approach targets as close as possible, and it is highly doubtful that the enemy will continue to let them do so. Fig. 3. Fragment of combat operation That is why Russian military experts and the Kamov company designers have set the concept of employment of the Ka-50 and Ka-52 helicopters on two principles. The first of them is the best use of the experience in the employment of weapons at ranges of up to 5 km as compared with other domestic combat helicopters. In particular, this is enhanced by the hardware exchange of information between helicopters (aircraft) and command posts to obtain precise target designation data. The other principle is based on assuring the possibility for search and standoff attack of targets at a range of 6 to 10 km. This so-called "long hand" principle was realized on the Ka-50 and Ka-52 helicopters owing to their surveillance and search systems which are capable of detecting and identifying targets at a range of 8 to 10 km, while allowing the Vikhr ATGM to hit tanks at a range of up to 8 km with a probability of 0.9. The technique of strike helicopter employment against counterair-covered ground targets is based on flying at extremely low altitudes, using the screening features of the terrain, forests and structures beyond the coverage of ADA and SAM systems. Then a momentary "hop" is made to scan the surface ahead and then get behind cover. If necessary, "hops" are repeated with changes in the cover to cause maximum difficulty for the point AD system in detecting the helicopters. For a fragment of a combat operation involving the use of strike helicopters against armor materiel incorporating ADA and SAM systems refer to Fig. 3. Shown at 1, 2 and 3 are possible positions of a combat helicopter to detect and identify ground targets, and at 4, the ATGM attack lines. Numerous exercises staged by the U.S. Army Aviation involving OH-58D reconnaissance helicopters, AH-64A (Apache), AH-64D and AH-64 Longbow attack rotorcraft, as well as some well-known military conflicts with their participation, have revealed insufficient effectiveness of the former, especially at night and in adverse weather conditions, which makes it impossible for the combat machine to fully realize its potential. In this context, the development of a new-generation reconnaissance helicopter, the RAH-66 Comanche, nears its completion. It has a takeoff weight of about 5,000 kg and is armed with four Hellfire ATGMs, a gun and air-to-air missiles. According to the design concept specified by the customer, the state-of-the-art optical, laser, TV, thermal imaging and radar equipment installed aboard the new reconnaissance helicopter will be fully capable of performing reconnaissance missions, providing precise target designation to the combat helicopter and weapons on other platforms (aircraft, missile launchers and gun mounts) and laser illumination of targets for the helicopter's own ATGMs and the ATGMs carried by the AH-64 helicopter. The RAH-66 helicopter, whose takeoff weight is 2.5 times that of the OH-58D, is estimated by foreign specialists as having the effective reflective area which is 1/200 that of the latter. Built with the use of stealth technology it is practically invisible for the point AD system. Installation of detachable wings to accommodate additional fuel tanks and armament (rockets, up to 14 Hellfire ATGMs and air-to-air missiles) on the base version turns the RAH-66 into a light combat helicopter also invisible for ADA and SAM systems. According to U.S. Army aviation specialists, the new tandem consisting of the RAH-66 reconnaissance helicopter and the AH-64 combat helicopter can fully realize the combat potential of the combat helicopter for destruction of enemy armor materiel and helicopters. A further increase in the effectiveness is planned to be achieved by gradually replacing the AH-64 by the RAH-66 in its combat version. So, the "shield versus sword" contest goes on. The U.S. Army has tested and is now updating a combat system based on reconnaissance and strike helicopters. The ratio of the former to the latter in an Army grouping is adjusted from time to time. The updated Army aviation structure envisages, for example, a combination of nine Comanches and fifteen Apaches as part of a heavy division attack battalion. The armies of other countries using combat helicopters considerably lag behind the USA as far as the depth of elaboration of the helicopter employment concept is concerned. The experience gained in the employment of combat helicopters in Russia allows the development of an alternative combat system whose effectiveness depends on the cooperation of Ka-50, Ka-52 and Ka-31 helicopters, informationally linked with ground and air command posts and AD systems. If used properly, the ability of strike helicopters to defeat air targets can considerably affect the course of the "shield versus sword" confrontation. For this purpose, it suffices for the organization of a reliable cooperation between combat helicopters and the point AD system of friendly armor units. At present, this can be realized by employing an army aviation command vehicle, the Ka-52 helicopter, maintaining permanent overt and covert communication links with ground command posts and combat helicopters. The basic condition for effective alliance between the point AD system and combat helicopters must be the air superiority of domestic attack rotorcraft over similar enemy counterparts. In Russia such helicopters are the Ka-50 and its two-seat version, the Ka-52. They boast a high thrust-to-weight ratio and unique agility, which allows them to take a position suitable for attack within the shortest time and minimum volume of air space. This is one of the qualities essential for gaining supremacy in a tight-turning dog fight. To conduct an air fight, the Ka-50 and Ka-52 helicopters possess a diverse arsenal of weapons. First, it is a powerful 30mm high firing rate gun capable of defeating air targets at ranges of up to 4 km. It is supplemented with air-to-air missiles with infrared homing heads, type Igla-V, and an effective range of 5 km, as well as supersonic Vikhr ATGMs with unified warheads used to kill both ground armor and air targets at ranges of up to 8 km. The said effective means of air target destruction, combined with the high agility of the machines, assure the Ka-50 and Ka-52 helicopters a victory over the enemy. The air space in which the helicopters are to fight may be either close to or above the line of contact, in the area with irregular terrain and multitude of smoke-and-dust formations. This makes the timely detection of air targets more difficult, though it may help in the delivery of sudden attacks from medium and short ranges. Sometimes, the decisive advantage in an air duel is gained by the side which was the first to detect an enemy aircraft. In the given situation, a great help to friendly helicopters and AD systems in timely and early detection of enemy combat helicopters and aircraft can be the Ka-31 radar picket helicopter unparalleled in the world helicopter industry. This helicopter can operate in all weathers over the friendly territory at a distance of 100 to 150 km from the line of contact and detect air targets like rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft, including those flying at extremely low altitudes, automatically track up to 20 of them and automatically send information over a covert communication link to ground and airborne command posts. The Ka-31 has proved to be the essential link of the system, capable of informationally linking command posts, AD systems and Ka-52, and Ka-50 helicopters in the struggle with enemy helicopters, divesting their attacks of concealment and surprise. The new RAH-66 helicopter, built with the use of stealth technology, is not invisible for the Ka-31 either. The rotating main rotor of the RAH-66 is a non-concealment feature. Given information on the detected enemy helicopters and their movements, our combat helicopters have a great advantage in execution of a concealed maneuver and surprise attack. In essence, we have an alternative armor protection system involving army aviation, leaving the enemy no chance for its successful penetration. The system may be connected, via ground command posts, to the guns on indirect laying positions. According to the information received, they can use volley fire to engage any enemy helicopters, including those flying at extremely low altitudes. The joint employment of the Ka-31, Ka-52 and Ka-50 helicopters, together with the AD systems, can make the "shield" protecting the armor materiel against air attacks more effective. Helicopters in Urban Fighting? Aviation Week & Space Technology May 13, 2002 Pg. 27 IAF To Modify Helos To Fight In Cities By Robert Wall and David A. Fulghum, Palmachim AFB, Israel, and Tel Aviv Weeks of intense attack helicopter operations in West Bank towns have produced important lessons for Israel Air Force pilots and service leaders; they need different weapons and more armed helicopters, and they have to learn to live with complex rules of engagement. "[The major discovery] we made, during the last operation, was the importance of helicopters for urban fighting," said IAF Commander Maj. Gen. Dani Halutz. Israeli helicopter pilots in recent weeks have been flying precision strike missions continuously in the West Bank. "We found out there are many ways to ease the land force's [workload] by using helicopters in the proper ways." Israeli helicopter crews are learning urban operations on the fly. Fighting in cities is a new problem and something "we never really trained for," said Capt. Gilad, a pilot in one of the IAF's two AH-1S Cobra attack helicopter squadrons. Military planners realized in 1996 after unrest in the West Bank they could face an urban conflict, but it didn't lead to significant training in this area. "It is not an easy mission," Halutz noted. Late last week, helicopter pilots were poised to resume combat operations, but this time in the Gaza Strip after a bombing near Tel Aviv earlier in the week that killed 15. Gaza was not targeted in the initial operation, but it is a stronghold of Hamas, which was blamed for the latest bombing. During its West Bank operation, the town of Jenin and its refugee camp proved particularly challenging because it is such a heavily built-up area. The problem was further complicated by the strict rules of engagement that pilots said they had to abide by. Those were intended to limit harm to bystanders and to reduce their pilots' exposure to air defenses. "We've had to be innovative all the time; it's a new war for us and the world," said a senior Cobra squadron member. To ensure that the proper targets were attacked, helicopter crews coordinated closely with the commanders who had access to live imagery of targets provided by unmanned aerial vehicles. The UAV sensor operators, commanders and helicopter crews worked with a common grid map on which each house was given a four-digit designation. The scheme ensured all personnel were looking at the same location when discussing a potential target. Pilots also were given photos showing each target from different angles to further dispel confusion. THE COOPERATION with the IAF's only UAV squadron was more intense than ever, said the senior Cobra pilot. Whenever attack helicopters took up position over a city, at least one unmanned aircraft was already on station. That allowed pilots to get information about the situation on the ground either from the air operations center that coordinated all activities or directly from the UAV unit. Nevertheless, pilots faced many operational hurdles in adapting to the new mission. In one instance, IDF troops on the ground were in distress and called for help from the helicopter forces. However, pilots about to provide close-air support had to abort the attack because they spotted figures in women's clothing in the crowd. "There's a lot of dilemmas like that," Gilad said. Attack helicopters rather than tanks were often called on to limit damage on the ground, even though using tanks would have meant fewer casualties among Israeli troops, a second IAF officer said. The IAF has used both Apache and Cobra attack helicopters for its campaign against perceived terrorist targets. Apaches have been used primarily against moving targets, while Cobras have been used mainly against buildings. The Tow missiles fired by Cobras have proven more useful for hitting structures than the Hellfire missiles shot from Apaches, IAF officials say. Among the Cobras' targets were snipers hiding in upper floors to shoot at IDF troops on the ground. Cobras also have fired the Rafael-built N-TD weapon, an Israeli official said. The 6-km.-range antiarmor weapon can be used either in a fire-and-forget mode or it can be guided using a fiber-optic link. It can use both infrared or electro-optical seekers and carries a tandem warhead. Additionally, IDF ground forces used laser designators to guide Hellfire missiles fired by Apaches that remained hidden behind terrain features. The scheme was designed to prevent helicopter noise from spoiling surprise attacks, U.S. sources said. One of the early lessons Cobra squadron members are drawing from their experience is that new warheads are required for the urban fight. The Tow and N-TD warheads are designed to penetrate tank hulls, but that means their performance is not ideal for attacking a room in a house. The antitank weapon doesn't produce enough of a blast to ensure that a person fighting from within a room is killed. Moreover, when houses containing explosives were attacked, helicopters had to fire multiple antitank missiles to destroy the target. The solution helicopters pilots are looking for is a blast/fragmenting warhead that would be large enough to destroy a room without inflicting damage beyond it. IAF officials now also are considering upgrading their UH-60 Blackhawks to carry weapons, a capability the U.S. Army has in its MH-60 special operations units. The IAF operates one Blackhawk squadron--with a mix of versions--and is about to field a second. The second squadron will receive its first helicopters this summer and become operational next year at a base near Be'er Sheeva in southern Israel. So far, Blackhawks have been deployed mainly to supply forces operating in the West Bank. The aircraft are receiving a desert brown paint scheme to make them more difficult to spot than in a black coating. THE IAF ALSO IS planning to replace its Cobras. Service leaders expect to buy either more AH-64 Apaches or the new AH-1Z four-bladed Cobra. Logisticians see advantages to having a single-aircraft force. However, there are also concerns that a technical problem could force the grounding of the entire attack helicopter fleet. Helicopter pilots have been ordered to avoid flying low unless it's absolutely necessary when operating over hostile territory. There is a deep concern that the loss of even a single aircraft would provide a huge morale boost to the opposition, even if it were due to a technical malfunction, rather than damage from ground fire. In addition, at least two helicopters always operate together for support and to summon aid. Antiterrorism operations haven't been restricted to the West Bank. Helicopter pilots also have flown into southern Lebanon, where Hezbollah fighters have fired Katyusha rockets into northern Israel. However, there are many surface-to-air missiles in that area, such as infrared-guided SA-7s and SA-14s. One pilot said, "We think they may even have SA-18s," a more modern IR-missile. In its northern area, the IAF keeps at least two attack helicopters ready for takeoff within 10 min. to respond to terrorist activities. FIXING U.S. ARMY AIR ASSAULT FORCE STRUCTURE & DOCTRINE These reports prove a number of things we have been saying: 1. Total nation-state war force quantities can overcome their inherent poor quality 2. 4th Generation Wars are won by who captures the MINDS of the populace through MANEUVER that collapses and changes the will of the enemy; we need an Air Assault doctrine that exploits both fixed and rotary wing aircraft to deliver 3D maneuver force with light tracked AFVs 3. Air-Mech-Strike delivery of troops/AFVs is the right way to win battles by MANEUVER; and Army Air Assault forces need a M113 "Mini-Gavin" AFV now as the lack of such a vehicles has been disastrous in Vietnam, Somalia and Iraq. 4. Helicopters must be silenced, made to fly faster, given means to lay smokescreens, land away from predictable LZs, and be SURVIVABLE---the flimsy gadget plane V-22 will not make it 5. Fixed-wing CAS observation/attack aircraft like A-10, UCAS, SU-25, SU-39 must operate with ground maneuver forces from forward strips, are also more effective than manned helicopters as currently configured 6. Our RoboCobra concept of turning Army AH-1 into UCAS/recon platforms is sound 7. Russia is having helicopter maintainability woes, too, we must SIMPLIFY our helicopters and conserve their flight hours by CONTAINERIZING them for shipment and through ground mobility means 8. Russia is doing the RAH-66 digital scout thing with its KA-50s, more costly than expendable RoboCobras, however 9. Air strikes indiscriminate against civilians; ground firepower more surgical, more likely to not help enemy's 4th GenWar efforts by atrocities 10. We need better Air and Ground Forward Air Control from both the USAF and the Army 11. Ee need a better U.S. Army Air Assault Badge to better recognize the importance of Air Assault troops and capabilities in the power projection U.S. Army. 12. Last but not least we need the SOCIOLOGICAL CHANGE to facilitate all these changes ie; WE NEED TO DISBAND U.S. ARMY AVIATION AS ITS OWN BRANCH and create a new "Air & Ground Cavalry Branch" with absurd "Armor" branch disbanded. Details: Why ARMOR branch is absurd: Tanks need a battlefield FUNCTION focus not a PLATFORM focus Why AVIATION branch is absurd: Helicopter fanatics have ruined U.S. Army Aviation Branch NOTES www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1988/BJW.htm AUTHOR Major J.W. Barton CSC 1988 SUBJECT AREA Aviation Executive Summary TITLE: Army Multiplier, The Birth of Airmobility I. Purpose: To examine the role of the helicopter and airmobility in Vietnam. Airmobility was born in Vietnam--The United States lost that war--Is airmobility suited for combat? II. Thesis: In Vietnam, Airmobility was a misapplied combat multiplier and as such, a failure to understand the nature of that war. In perspective, airmobility was not the cause of the ultimate defeat of the U.S. national objectives. It did, however, contribute to that defeat. III. Data: Nothing has done more to multiply the combat power of the Army as the helicopter. It has driven force structure changes and revolutions in tactics. Today's Army Aviation was born in the Vietnam War, a war we lost Airmobility, synonymous with Vietnam, contributed to that defeat. Unable to carry America to victory in a low-intensity-conflict, the most limited form of war, airmobility is given no place in future wars by military reformers. Airmobility did not cause the American defeat in Vietnam--it did, however, contribute. Too much reliance was placed on airmobility. The move to airmobility was rushed from the beginning. Needing a quick end to the conflict, the Secretary of Defense pushed for a technological answer, disregarding the political and social problems. The Army leadership, blinded by the initial successes of airmobile forces, came to view airmobility the tactic as a strategy. This strategy, highly successful in battles with main forces, removed the Army from the Vietnamese villages, a must in a counterinsurgency war. The American pattern of operations, from basecamp to landing zone, was quickly recognized by the enemy, allowing them to gain control over the pace of the war. IV. Conclusions: The improper application of airmobility contributed to America's loss in Vietnam. With the political leadership avoiding the social and political problems, and the Army, locked into a body count mentality substituting tactics for strategy, the North Vietnamese were able to control the operational tempo of the war. Unable to defeat the U.S. Army on the battlefield, they conducted a "war of time" against the American will and won. V. Summary: Not prepared for a counterinsurgency war, the Army's reliance on technology distorted its strategic vision. This misapplication can be forgiven, for the military decisions were made in the heat of battle, and the management of the war effort directed from Washington D.C. Not so easily overlooked are the military reformers conclusions that the helicopter and airmobility are not suited for combat. This conclusion fixes the failure on a tactic, a part of the whole effort, which was mistakenly utilized as the strategy for prosecuting the war in Vietnam. Vietnam: Army Multiplier, The Birth of Airmobility Outline Thesis Statement: In South Vietnam, Airmobility was a misapplied combat multiplier and as such, an indicator of a failure to understand the nature of the conflict. I. Helicopter and Airmobility, Product of Vietnam A. The War Lost 1. Military Failure 2. Tactical/Strategic Errors B. Helicopter Love Affair C. The Death Knoll 1. Military Reformers 2. The Contradiction II. Airmobile Combat Score A. Casualties B. Insurgency Destroyed C. NVA Main Force Intervention D. South Vietnam Falls III. Failure of Understanding/The Misapplied Multiplier A. Cause/Contributor B. The Technological Solution C. Rush to Airmobility 1. Pre-Vietnam 2. Rogers Board Report 3. The Secretary of Defense (a) Civilian Control (b) New Look (c) No Veto (d) Operation Chopper 4. Howze Board Report 5. Newest Technology Toy IV. 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) A. Strategy before Testing B. The Ia Drang 1. The Battle 2. Glorified Strengths 3. Forgotten Vulnerabilities V. The U.S. Leadership A. Overlooked Weaknesses B. Tactics Substitution for Strategy 1. Combat Victory Dilemma 2. Waiting Game C. The American Style 1. The Press 2. Village Operations VI. The North Vietnamese A. Quick to Adapt 1. Initiative 2. Casualty Rates B. Force Sacrifice C. The American Will VII. Technology and Tactics Blind Strategy A. Social/Political Conflict B. Counterinsurgency Strategy C. American Leadership Retrospective D. The Reformers 1. Sterile Evaluation 2. Flawed Conclusions E. The True Airmobility Vietnam: Army Multiplier, The Birth of Airmobility Nothing since the introduction of mechanized forces and the tank in World War I has done more to multiply the combat power of the American Army as has the helicopter. It has driven force structure changes and revolutions in tactical doctrine. Today's Army Aviation was born in the Vietnam War. The helicopter produced a "new mobility" to fight a guerrilla war, yet, like any weapons system it can only be viewed as part of the whole. The United States lost the war in Vietnam. The national objective of maintaining a friendly non-communist government in South Vietnam was just another strategic failure in light of the North Vietnamese invasion and subsequent fall of Saigon in the Spring of 1975. If the United States lost, then the United States Military failed. Given that the military failed, glaring tactical or strategic errors must have been made upon which the failure can be fixed. The United States enjoyed overwhelming technological and materiel superiority. A look at how the Army operated in Vietnam revealed "the dominate characteristic as the development of infantry organizations and tactics during the war with increasing emphasis and dependence on airmobile concepts and tactics." (4:31) There it is then! The Army's love affair with the helicopter in Vietnam grew to be a blinding love. The helicopter, and with it, the tactics it generated (airmobility), were not the combat multiplier that the Army thought, but rather a "combat divider." The answer seems so obvious. That magnificient flying machine, synonymous with the Vietnam War, must have, in a large measure, contributed to the United States' defeat. The helicopter was not suited to counterinsurgency warfare. The death knoll for the helicopter and airmobility has been sounded by numerous military reformers. Tied to Vietnam, unable to carry America to a victory in a low-intensity-conflict, the most limited form of war, the helicopter and airmobility are given no chance of success or survival in any future conflict, especially on a mid to high intensity battlefield. [EDITOR: author confuses 3D maneuver-- "airmobility" with the helicopter when you can get the former with fixed-wing aircraft, too] Mr. Bill Lind, renowned marine corps reformer, most recently pronounced this [anti-helicopter] position during his address to the marine command and staff college at Quantico, Virginia, in January 1988. As a student in that audience and an Army Aviator, the deductive logic he followed to arrive at his conclusion was hard to swallow, yet sounded convincing [EDITOR: a "specious" argument]. As I pursued this theme, however, something seemed amiss. An argument lodged somewhere in the back of my mind kept tapping on my consciousness. As I read and researched I found myself surrounded by examples of capabilities that do not support the premature death of Airmobility. A fundamental inconsistency appeared in the reformers' arguments. It is best expressed through a conversation between an American and North Vietnamese Officer. "An American colonel on diplomatic duty in Hanoi remarked to his North Vietnamese counterpart, 'You know you never defeated us on the battlefield.' The North Vietnamese General paused and then responded, 'That may be so, but is also irrelevant.'"(10:573) {EDITOR: author misses the points of the reformers and does not refute them. As Vietnam war progressed enemy heavy machine guns and SAMs decimated helicopters trying to land on predictable landing zones...the short range artillery firebase to launch Air Mobile operations was smashed by long-range enemy artillery...author does nothing to get off his aviator ass and improve the helicopter so it can contribute on modern battlefield, just makes excuses and rationalizations] The United States Armed Forces were successful in inflicting terrible casualities on the North Vietnamese Forces. As one observer stated, "On the battlefield itself, the United States Forces were unbeatable. In engagement after engagement, the forces of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) were thrown back with terrible losses."(13:1) How then, does one point to an Army tactic and label it a combat divider? The Army won most of the battles. Such success is not found through the use of a combat divider. Airmobility was an effective tactical tool in defeating the enemy forces. General Bruce Palmer has stated, "The direction, conduct, and operational performance during the 1962-1969 period generally were professional and commendable."(11:155) By 1972 the United States and South Vietnamese Forces had defeated the guerrilla insurgency (Viet Cong) to the point that the North Vietnamese were forced to conduct a massive invasion of their own using conventional forces. At two in the morning on the tenth of March 1975, seventeen (17) NVA Divisions began a campaign that would defeat the South.(14:279) The often overlooked irony of course is that, in the end, the Victor was an invading army, not an internal insurgency force. [EDITOR: author Barton misses the point. NVA had figured out how to defeat helicopter Air Mobility by smashing fire bases choppers operated from with long range artillery and ambushing them when they tried to land in predictable open areas with heavy machine guns and man-portable SAMs.] Now the entire problem is revealed. Airmobility is accused of not being suited for a counterinsurgency war, while at the same time, the effectiveness of the U.S. Forces in defeating North Vietnamese main forces is repeatedly demonstrated. In the end, however, the Viet Cong insurgency was no longer "a serious contender for power" (14:279) and the NVA main forces had won the victory. Airmobility then was not a combat divider. In South Vietnam. Airmobility was a misapplied combat multiplier and as such, an indicator of a failure to understand the nature of the conflict. In perspective, airmobility was not the cause of the ultimate defeat of U.S. national objectives. It did, however, contribute to that defeat. Too much reliance was placed on airmobility to achieve the national objectives in Southeast Asia. A highly successful tactic, airmobility became a strategic vision. The U.S. Army had not planned for a war such as the Vietnamese conflict. The rush to airmobility as a tactic, coupled with the immense early success in Vietnam, led to its incorrect application. The overreliance on airmobility demonstrated our faith in technological solutions to what was a military, social, and political problem. [EDITOR: this is Barton's cop-out to not get off his ass and fix the technical problems of Army Aviation by saying the job was too hard and we shouldn't focus in on technology; ie its a CYA ploy by him] Finally, airmobility contributed to the blinding of the Army leadership in Vietnam. That leadership failed to recognize the tactical versus strategic applications of airmobility, as well as the political nature of the struggle. (1:17) An analysis of the war in Southeast Asia by Paddy Griffith in his book, Forward Into Battle features five distinct campaigns waged by the participants. These campaigns are characterized as: -The International Political Struggle -The Strategic Bombing Campaign -The Interdiction Campaign -The Main Force Battle -The Pacification or Village War The failure of the Army's leadership to recognize the proper relationship between the village war, the main force war, and the international political struggle are intertwined with the analysis of airmobility. [EDITOR: since when does the U.S. military composed of people on public payroll liviung in fantasy garrison bases give a damn about civilian life?] The errors of vision that were made, were at the time, not at all obvious. The Army was "set up" for misapplication and a failure to properly focus its use of airmobility. The airmobility effort was rushed and blinded by initial successes. The rush to airmobility within the Army began in March of 1960 with the publication of the Rogers Board report. This report provided "essential aviation guidance for development, procurement, and personnel planning and recommended extensive evaluation and testing." (15:9) Although the helicopter had been utilized during the Korean War, it had been limited to combat support roles for medical evacuation and resupply. Early in 1961, General Maxwell D. Taylor, presidential military advisor, reported after a survey trip to Vietnam that "lack of adequate roads, lines of communication, and means of mobility contribute to the government's problems in South Vietnam." (15:15) After this impetus, events in Washington occurred with unprecedented speed, and for the first time, a military evolution was managed by the civilian military leadership. In September 1961, then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara directed the Army to restudy its future aviation requirements. Displeased with the resulting report, the third major revision in two years, McNamara directed a "bold new look at land warfare mobility." (15:18) The Secretary called for a "major effort to exploit the aeronautical potential and increase its effectiveness vis-a-vis a ground transportation system." (15:18) This tasking called for results in terms of cost effectiveness and directed that field tests and exercises be conducted. There should be "no veto or dilution by conservative views." (15:18) The race was on. The United States Army, an organization of mechanized and "leg infantry" divisions would become airmobile. [EDITOR: WRONG!!!! U.S. Army already had two Airborne divisions that were "air mobile" using fixed-wing aircraft in cooperation with the U.S. Air Force. This is typical self-serving Army Aviator BS. You can see this entire paper is an excuse-mongering fest for Army helicopter branch] In December of 1961, 400 men and 32 H-21 helicopters of the 57th and 8th Transportation Companies participated in Operation Chopper, the first tactical operation involving the air movement of combat troops into battle. Approximately 1000 South Vietnamese Paratroopers were airlifted into a Viet Cong headquarters where they captured a radio facility from a surprised enemy. (15:3) The Army study on airmobility in a conventional role was completed in August of 1962 with the Howze Board Report. The Howze Report concluded that the shift to airmobility was "inevitable, just as was that from animal mobility to motor." (15:24) Secretary McNamara was given his newest technological invention, the Airmobile Division. Trucks were reduced from 3452 to 1100 and helicopters were increased from 100 to 459. (15:22) [EDITOR: notice no armored tracks even though M113 Gavins were available] Had a veto or diluting view been allowed, the Secretary might have taken notes from a Viet Cong manual captured in 1962 outlining the disadvantages of airmobile tactics: -Operations separate forces from population -Separation from villages retains insurgency infrastructure -Necessarily small forces lifted can be counterattacked -Enemy strike elements are unfamiliar with terrain -Easily surrounded and defeated -Ambushes easily employed against landings (15:27) The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), the Army's first airmobile division, was activated on 1 July 1965 after a tentative decision in March of that year (the steamroller to airmobility was in gear). (15:61) One month later, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (1st Cav) were in Vietnam. Airmobility was envisioned as the combat multiplier that would cut the force ratios required for counterinsurgency operations from 10-15 to 1 to 4 to 1. (6:157) [EDITOR: typical anti-physical hubris we see today to sell "less as more" when really LESS IS LESS. Planet Earth is still a big place and SIZE and PHYSICALITY still matters.] (A strategic implication before the first tactical engagement) The opportunity for the first test of the 1st Cav and airmobility came during the Battle of the Ia Drang, which quickly demonstrated the vulnerabilities of the new "American way of war" as well as its strengths. LTC Harold G. Moore's 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalry was airlifted into a small clearing near the Ia Drang. General Giap's NVA Division detected the insertion, and he ordered two of his regiments, the 66th and 33rd, to quickly encircle and eliminate the Americans. As LTC Moore sent one of his companies out to a supporting position, the Americans ran into the NVA troops positioning to attack the landing zone. This accidental encounter probably saved the 1/7th from annihilation, and the ensuing battle raged for two days. Properly warned, LTC Moore's Battalion fought off numerous human wave assaults, decimating the two attacking regiments. As the survivors of these two regiments and the rest of the committed NVA division attempted to withdraw toward the border, five South Vietnamese battalions were airlifted into blocking positions astride their escape routes. Caught in a trap, the unsuspecting NVA were annihilated by American artillery and the South Vietnamese battalions. (12:116-131) The Battle for the Ia Drang had been a dramatic success. Airmobility had made a glorious entrance. "As an example, artillery batteries displaced sixty-seven times and still managed to fire 33,108 rounds!" (12:130) The NVA, committing a division of regulars with the expectation of cutting South Vietnam in half had been decimated by one airmobile battalion. (10:548) "The political and military leaders of the United States were buoyed by the superb performance of the first marine and Army battalions that met the NVA." (10:552) General Westmoreland stated, "The ability of the Americans to meet and defeat the best troops the enemy could put on the field of battle was once more demonstrated beyond any possible doubt, as was the validity of the Army's airmobility concept." (6:169) What was overlooked were the vulnerabilities and weaknesses inherent in the plight of LTC Moore's 1/7 Cavalry on the Ia Drang. Once dismounted from the aircraft, his forces had no mobility. American units developed the pattern of tying themselves to their landing zones. They would not leave the security of the air lifeline. The initiative belonged to the enemy. He could maneuver, fight, or withdraw as he chose. On the Ia Drang, the 1st Cav engaged an enemy unfamiliar with airmobility or the dangers of massing in the face of overwhelming American firepower. The NVA and Viet Cong forces were quick to adapt. Airmobility's utility on the battlefield was considerable as future operations would show. It provided a "Sunday Punch of unequalled flexibility and versatility." (11:156) But that "Sunday Punch" had to be set up, the location and timing carefully selected. Instead, "it came to dominate American tactical thinking and to dictate the very manner of fighting." (11:180) Where Soldiers walked, they had to stay close to planned landing zones (LZs) to insure casualty pickup and resupply. When inserted by air, troops were forced to travel light--too light to survive without an air LOC. [EDITOR if they had miniaturized M113 Gavins or the AR/AAV they could have hgad superior levels of ammo, water and food] This in turn necessitated leaving combat troops behind to guard the precious LZ after each insertion. The enemy forces seized on the American pattern and took control over the tempo of the war. As Sir Robert Thompson observed, "you were never mobile on your feet. The enemy, who was mobile on his feet, could actually decide whether he was going to have a battle with you in the first place, and he would break it off whenever he wanted to." (14:178) The enemy could then move from main force war to guerrilla war at his will. The United States continued to fight a main force war. Once substantial enemy forces were located, airmobile forces were quickly inserted into the area with outstanding results. However, once the surviving enemy broke contact, the Americans withdrew to their firebases and basecamps, and the enemy could move with impunity throughout the villages and countryside. This insistence on fighting the "American way of war" was not nearly flexible enough. As Professor Earl Ravenal noted in Lessons of Vietnam ". . . it requires the appropriate target." (14:256) Despite this misapplication, the reliance on the "American way of war" even when the target was not appropriate, the U.S. Army was, according to many measures, successful. This dilemma cannot be ignored. Tactical mobility and firepower contributed to an 8 to 1 kill ratio of NVA and Viet Cong to American and South Vietnamese Soldiers. (13:110) There must be another side to the story. In October 1967, Secretary of Defense McNamara visited Vietnam. He departed sobered and reported that the "enemy has adopted a strategy of keeping us busy and waiting us out." (6:183) The Army, with its one year tours, body count mentality, and habit of "lunging into areas of marginal political importance," was demonstrating a lack of understanding of both the "village war" and the international political struggle. (6:122) In 1968, only 80,000 of 543,000 Soldiers in Vietnam were combat troops. The rest constituted the massive logistical tail needed to conduct an airmobile war while maintaining the American way of life in Vietnam. (1:6-10) With most of these combat troops dedicated to searching out and destroying enemy main forces, the United States did not have the assets to conduct or even learn the nature of the counterinsurgency war. (6:197) General Westmoreland felt that he could endure less than the ideal force structures and conditions because he was sure victory would be ours eventually. General Westmoreland was wrong. The war was being fought for time, not space or body counts. While the United States stuck to its style of war, the enemy could control not only his own casualty rate, but that of the American forces as well. (6:122) Through the control of the casualty rate, the will of the American people could be exploited. If the press reported to the American people that the Army was winning, the NVA and Viet Cong only had to join a few battles and inflict a few casualties to turn the Antiwar heat back up in America. With no strategy to control area or be involved on a large scale with the villages, the U.S. Army missed the opportunity to see the war for what it was. An Airmobility strategy, not airmobile tactics was partially responsible for this failure. "As one airmobile commander ruefully stated after the war, 'We should have done less flittin and more sittin.'"(14:88) The North Vietnamese did not miss the impact of their control over the initiative and casualty rates. The Americans and South Vietnamese were able to destroy the insurgency by 1968 (thus eliminating the Viet Cong as a contender for power in 1972 and 1975) because the North Vietnamese were willing to sacrifice the guerrilla to win the international political struggle at TET. Not only had General Westmoreland failed to recognize the conflict as a war of time against the American will, he had also failed to understand the willingness of the North Vietnamese to take terrible punishment. In retrospect, the United States' reliance on technology and the substitution of tactics such as airmobility and firepower for strategic efforts were contributing factors to the prolonging of the war, and thus the loss of the war. We allowed the enemy to set the pace. In so doing, we saved American lives. "That the fewer casualties may have been entirely wasted does not occur to the many." (12:184) One more seldom considered effect of the American way of war in Vietnam was its cumulative effect on the people of South Vietnam. The long years of indiscriminate high technology warfare and the suffering it inflicted did much to undermine the efforts of the South Vietnamese government (corrupt as it was) (3:112) to win the allegiance of its people. (8:403) Dr. Andrew F. Krepepinevich, in The Army and Vietnam, best illustrates the effect of our sterotyped and ritualized successes in operations and tactics: If the Army had followed a counterinsurgency strategy, both the human and financial costs of the war would have been significantly lower. This in turn would have assisted to some extent in maintaining popular support within the United States for American participation in the war. It would have placed the Army in a position to sustain its efforts in a conflict environment certain to produce a protracted war. True to its concept, the Army focused on technological and logistical dimensions of strategy while ignoring the political and social dimensions that formed the foundation of the counterinsurgency warfare. (6:233) The improper utilization and overreliance on airmobile tactics by the United States contributed to--but did not cause--the Vietnam defeat. Not prepared for a counterinsurgency war, the Army's reliance on technology distorted its strategic vision. This misapplication can be forgiven, for the military decisions were made in the heat of battle, and the management of the war effort directed from Washington D.C. [EDITOR: NO BULLSHIT!!! IT CANNOT BE FORGIVEN! GET OFF YOUR FUCKING ASS AND LEARN THEN!! WHY HAS THE U.S. ARMY NOT LEARNED ITS LESSON SINCE THEN?] Not so easily overlooked, however, are the conclusions being drawn by the military reformers. Extracted from 13 years of sterile academic evaluation after the war, they arrive at a flawed conclusion--that the helicopter and airmobility are not suited for combat. [EDITOR SAYS WHO? YOU, BARTON? Where are your facts otherwise that our current, slow, loud, painted in the wrong dark green color helicopters will NOT be shot down by enemy heavy machine guns, air bursting RPGs and MANPADS?] This conclusion fixes the failure on a tactic, a part of the whole effort, which was mistakenly utilized as the strategy for prosecuting the war effort. [EDITOR: A LIE. Reformers do not complain about the Vietnam war's loss on the helicopter, they complain about the helicopter itself and what it fails to do! What a lying SOB Barton is. No wonder why Army Aviation "Branch" is so F--ed up.] The military leadership of the United States Armed Forces have recognized and corrected their error. It's time the reformers did the same, and examine airmobility in its true context.[EDITOR: give helicopters a pass because they were given too hard a job, boo hoo] Airmobility is not a strategy--it is a tactic of maneuver--a combat multiplier as part of the combined arms team. Viewed in this correct context, Airmobility is a dynamic success--the Vietnam battle results speak for themselves. [EDITOR: THE FUCK THEY DO. 4, 000 helicopters lost in Vietnam. Heavy casualties fighting the enemy on foot M16 vs AK-47 and RPG. A bad "tactic" passed on to the South Vietnamese that RESULTED IN THEIR NATION BEING LOST TO THE NVA WHEN THE LATTER SMASHED THEIR FIREBASES.] BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. BDM Corporation Study: "The Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam", Carlisle, Pa: The Strategic Studies Institute, 1980. 2. Brown, Weldon A. The Last Chopper. New York: National University Publications, 1976. 3. Buttinger, Joseph. Vietnam: The Unforgotten Tradegy. New York: Horizon Press, 1977. 4. Doughty, Robert A. Leavenworth Paper Number 1: The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-1976. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1979. 5. Dupuy, William E. "Vietnam: What We Might Have Done and Why We Didn't Do It." 20th Century War: The American Experience Book of Readings. Ed. Combat Studies Institute. Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC, 1986, PP.387-409. 6. Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986. 7. Lewy, Guenter. America in Vietnam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978. 8. Lewy, Guenter. "Epilogue: The Legacy of Vietnam." 20th Century War: The American Experience Book of Readings. Ed. Combat Studies Institute. Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC, 1986. 9. Millett, Allan R. A Short History of the Vietnam War. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1978. 10. Millet, Allan R. and Peter Maslowski. For The Common Defense. New York: Free Press, 1984. 11. Palmer, Bruce, Jr. The 25 Year War: America's Role in Vietnam. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984. 12. Palmer, Dave Richard. Summons of the Trumphet: US-Vietnam in Perspective. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1978. 13. Summers, Harry G., Jr. On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1982. 14. Thompson, W. Scott and Donald D. Frizzell. The Lessons of Vietnam. New York: Crane, Russak and Company, 1977. 15. Tolson, John J. Airmobility 1961-1971. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1973. 16. U.S. marine corps command and staff college. The Writing Program Volume II. Quantico, VA: The U.S. marine corps, 1987 FEEDBACK! itsg@hotmail.com 1st TSG (A) S2 Roy S. Ardillo II writes: "The Howze Board envisioned the airmobile division as a conventional force that would fly behind Russian lines and delay the second echelon armies. There were to be five with separate transportation brigades and attack helicopter brigades. It was designed for conventional warfare with five divisions a reinforcing all of NATO in the different sectors. Used in a counterinsurgency role was not its intended purpose.